Came across this website earlier which had a pretty unique story about Omar Suleiman from a torture victim of his... Of course, no way to verify the validity of the statements but the Australian courts finally acknowledged that the victim had been taken to Egypt for rendition...
Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib was captured and tortured in the years after September 11 in both Egypt and Guantanamo Bay.  

Excerpts from Mamdouh Habib's book that reference Suleiman are extracted below:

pp.112-115

The guard quickly told me that the very big boss was coming to talk to me, and that I must be well behaved and co-operate. Everyone was nervous. I have since found out that the boss was Omar Suleiman, head of all Egyptian security. He was known for personally supervising the interrogation of al-Qaeda suspects and sending reports to the CIA. In the beginning, he was often present during my interrogations. He must have thought that he had a big fish when I was sent to him by the Americans and Australians.

I was sitting in a chair, hooded, with my hands handcuffed behind my back. He came up to me. His voice was deep and rough. He spoke to me in Egyptian and English. He said, “Listen, you don’t know who I am, but I am the one who has your life in his hands. Every single person in this building has his life in my hands. I just make the decision.”

I said, “I hope your decision is that you make me die straight away.”

“No, I don’t want you to die now. I want you to die slowly.” He went on, “I can’t stay with you; my time is too valuable to stay here. You only have me to save you. I’m your saviour. You have to tell me everything, if you want to be saved. What do you say?”

“I have nothing to tell you.”

“You think I can’t destroy you just like that?” He clapped his hands together.

“I don’t know”. I was feeling confused. Everything was unreal.

“If God came down and tried to take you by the hand, I would not let him. You are under my control. Let me show you something that will convince you.”

The guard then guided me out of the room and through an area where I could see, from below the blindfold, the trunks of palm trees. We then went through another door back inside, and descended some steps. We entered a room. They sat me down.

“Now you are going to tell me that you planned a terrorist attack”, Suleiman persisted.

“I haven’t planned any attacks.”

“I give you my word that you will be a rich man if you tell me you have been planning attacks. Don’t you trust me?” he asked.

“I don’t trust anyone”, I replied.

Immediately he slapped me hard across the face and knocked off the blindfold; I clearly saw his face.

“That’s it. That’s it. I don’t want to see this man again until he co-operates and tells me he’s been planning a terrorist attack! he yelled at the others in the room, then stormed out.

The guard came up to me, upset that I hadn’t co-operated.

I said to him, “You have to let me go soon; it’s nearly 48 hours.”

He looked at me, surprised, and asked, “How long do you think you’ve been here?”

“A day”, I replied.

“Man, you’ve been here for more than a week.”

They then took me to another room, where they tortured me relentlessly, stripping me naked and applying electric shocks everywhere on my body. The next thing I remember was seeing the general again. He came into the room with a man from Turkistan; he was a big man but was stooped over, because his hands were chained to the shackles of his feet, preventing him from standing upright.

“This guy is no use to us anymore. This is what is going to happen to you. We’ve had him for one hour, and this is what happens.”

Suddenly, a guy they called Hamish, which means snake, came at the poor man from behind and gave him a terrible karate kick that sent him crashing across the room. A guard went over to shake him, but he didn’t respond. Turning to the general, the guard said, “Basha, I think he’s dead.”

“Throw him away then. Let the dogs have him.”

They dragged the dead man out.

“What do you think of that?” asked the general, staring into my face.

“At least he can rest now”, I replied.

Then they brought another man in. This man, I think, was from Europe – his exclamations of pain didn’t sound like those of someone from the Middle East. He was in a terrible state. The guard came in with a machine and started to wire up the guy to it. They told the poor man that they were going to give him a full electric shock, measuring ten on the scale. Before they even turned the machine on, the man started to gasp and then slumped in the chair. I think he died of a heart attack.

The general said that there was one more person I had to see. “This person will make you see that we can keep you here for as long as we want, all of your life, if we choose.”

There was a window in the room, covered by a curtain. The general drew back a curtain, and I saw the top half of a very sick, thin man. He was sitting on a chair on the other side of the glass, facing me.

“You know this guy?” the general asked.

“No”, I replied.

“That’s strange – he’s your friend from Australia.”

I looked again, and was horrified to see that it was Mohammed Abbas, a man I had known in Australia who had worked for Telstra [Australian telecommunications company]. He had travelled to Egypt in 1999, and had never been seen again.

“He is going to be your neighbour for the rest of your life.”

It was then that I knew I was in Egypt, without a doubt. They then took Abbas away and closed the curtain.

p.118

After the first interrogation with Suleiman, I believed the Egyptians weren’t interested in where I had been; they only wanted me to confess to being a terrorist and having plotted terrorist attacks so they could sell the information to the United States and Australia. I decided then that I wouldn’t answer questions or explain anything; but, as a consequence, I was badly tortured in Egypt.

p.133

The Egyptians didn’t like Maha [Habib’s wife] at all. One day, I overheard Omar Suleiman saying to someone, “I would love to bring Maha here.” I have no idea when this was but the memory of these few words is very vivid in my mind. Fortunately, though, Suleiman could never have gotten hold of Maha, because she is Lebanese born and an Australian citizen. Suleiman, before my release from Egypt, often threatened that he would get me back if I ever said anything bad about Egypt.

Went through those leaked STRATFOR email a few weeks back and had taken these notes so figured I would post them up here for anybody who is interested... This is not comprehensive but rather just some of the more interesting details that emerged (mainly focused around Middle East, but some random outlandish stories included as well).  For disclosures sake (not that it matters) I did subsribe to STRATFOR for one year following the Jan25 uprising in Egypt as they provided good daily news bulletins and frequent updates/reports - although the Egypt focused content decreased substantially following the parliamentary elections... Without further ado: 

1. Russia-Israel-Georgia-Mexico-Iran weapons trading/espionage ring – this adds some additional credence to the whole Iran taking over a US unmanned drone and landing it safely per the code swaps and drone hacks
2. Examples of Mexican-Israel corruption
3. View from  an IDF source who was an old high school buddy of a STRATFOR employee
4. Egypt – Post Mubarak – nothing groundbreaking but a summary of STRATFOR’s views that it was a palace coup and not a true revolution of the people (i.e. without army desiring removal of Mubarak nothing would have happened)
5. On Hamas’ role/view on Egyptian revolution
6. Libyan Contact – correspondences between an employee of SCG International who was on the ground around September 2011
7. Hugo Chavez health issues and Venezuela transition plus some tidbits around Iran and George Friedman’s advice on how to secure a source
8. Feeling that global elite are lost:  These emails are from 2010 and also have much discussion about Kissinger believing Iran is about to go to war which obviously turned out to be false…
9. Halliburton alleged dirty games
10. Crazy discussion about Israeli commandos using Kurdish elements (or Jewish citizens) within Iran to bomb nuclear infrastructure in November, 2011
11. STRATFOR’s Middle East source (Lebanese military apparently) and a Hamas member gave this overview of Syria claiming that Iran is reaching out to the US on controlled regime change
12. Other
    

          a. Interesting case of Wachovia (seemingly knowingly) participating in the handling of
             $125B of Mexican drug money each year between 2004-2007
          b. Interesting correspondence around Flotilla sabatoge… Nothing groundbreaking but just
             clearly they are supportive of Israel’s position (i.e. writing “Nice move” when the
             sabotage was successful
          c. Apparently, Democrats were ballot stuffing in US elections but McCain decided to be
             the bigger man

1. Russia-Israel-Georgia-Mexico-Iran weapons trading/espionage ring (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/64027_insight-russia-israel-georgia-mexico-defense-deals-and-swaps.html) – this adds some additional credence to the whole Iran taking over a US unmanned drone and landing it safely per the code swaps and drone hacks

• This is the interesting part, though. Idra had an offer to sell UAVs to Georgia (this was happening during and after the war).The reason Georgia needed the UAVs is because the UAVs they had bought from Israel had been compromised by the Russians. The Russians got the data link for the UAV (there is some suspicion that the Israelis after the war may have given this to them. Remember all the intense mtgs b/w the Israelis and the Russians where the Russians got the Israelis to back off of defense deals to Georgia in return for Russia backing off Iran?). Anyway, the Georgians gave Idra a picture of one of their crashed UAVs. The source explained though that if the UAV were targeted, it would have been blown to pieces pretty much (it's like the size of a car basically). But the picture he saw showed the UAV intact. He inquired and basically what happened was that the Russians acquired the data link to hack into the system and force the UAV into the ground. I think they may have crashed another one too.
• Here is the most interesting part: I inquired more about the compromised Israeli UAVs. What he explained was that Israel and Russia made a swap -- Israel gave Russia the 'data link' code for those specific UAVs; in return, Russia gave Israel the codes for Iran's Tor-M1s. 
• I asked about the S-300 (source tracks a lot of defense deals for Jane's). He doesn't think the Russians will give it to the Iranians. Besides, he said... Israel and Turkey have been collaborating very closely on the S-300s. He explain how about 8 years ago when Russia sold S-300s to Greece to base in Crete (which were supposed to protect Cyprus), Russia delivered those with a carrier so that Turkey wouldn't try to sink them. (things got a bit noisy so i may have misheard some of this). The gist of what he said is that Turkey has been cracking the S-300 since the Crete sale and has been sharing intel on the S-300 with the Israelis to ensure that they retain an advantage over Iran should Iran get them from the Russians. as far as the Georgian UAVs go, they were interested in the Mexican ones because the Mexican UAVs had something (forget the name. it was auto-something' that basically backs up teh UAV system in case someone hacks into it and immediately returns the UAV to base.

2. Examples of Mexican-Israel corruption (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/64027_insight-russia-israel-georgia-mexico-defense-deals-and-swaps.html)

• There is a private Mexican company called Idra that the government funded to make UAVs. They are actually pretty high standard according to him and beat out the Israeli UAVs in testing. My friend was consulting Idra at the time and so he was privy to a lot of deals that were on the table. This is the story --
• The Mexican government is now paying some $25m (? can get the #s later) for UAVs from Israel. Idra is basically like WTF, but the reason is basically corruption. There is a deal b/w the Mexican interior ministry and the Israelis where they're getting a hefty kickback.

3. View from  an IDF source who was an old high school buddy of a STRATFOR employee (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/211021_re-alpha-re-sending-with-source-code-insight-israel-convo.html) – overall comes across as arrogant and condescending…

• When I tried to explain that we typically scoff at calling it the Arab Spring as well, I was cut off, so that I could hear another lecture about how horrible Arabs were.
• Source is in D.C. frequently for meetings with DIA. When I asked if they are often trained by the Americans, the response was a smirk and, "We like to think we don't need the Americans to train us." IDI, source said, is "more creative" than American counterparts
• Source openly said that none of this shit would be happening right now had Obama not abandoned Mubarak like he did.
• Because Obama abandoned Mubarak, source lamented the fact that Egypt was no longer the leader of the Arab world. This does not mean source believes the MB is on the verge of completely taking power in Egypt - (I specifically asked if that was the belief the IDI holds) - but it does mean that there is a steep drop in faith that the SCAF has ability to maintain the status quo. Overall I found the message on Egypt a bit confusing.
• Source says they jokingly refer to AQAP as "AQHP" after the HP printer bombs that got seized on those DHL flights a few years back.
  

4. Egypt – Post Mubarak (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/309308_re-for-comment-conclusion-to-egypt-monograph-contemporary.html) – nothing groundbreaking but a nice summary of STRATFOR’s views that it was a palace coup and not a true revolution of the people (i.e. without army desiring removal of Mubarak nothing would have happened)

• As (now deposed) President Mubarak aged, however, an internal challenge arose to the military oligarchy in the form of the former president’s son, Gamal Mubarak, who wanted to transform Egypt from a military oligarchy into a more traditional Egyptian dynasty. Doing this required the breaking of the militarya**s hold on the economy. Gamal and his allies -- often with the express assistance of international institutions like the World Bank -- worked to privatize Egyptian state assets to themselves. This process was a direct threat to the military’s political and economic position at the top of Egyptian society. The military also viewed Gamal, who never completed his military service, as a political neophyte, incapable of understanding and managing the country’s security imperatives.
• The result was the Arab Spring. In the months leading up to the January demonstrations, Egypt’s top generals were delivering very stern ultimatums to the president to abandon any hope of passing the reins to Gamal while looking at their options to unseat Mubarak via more unconventional means. The military strategically positioned itself early on in the demonstration as the honest broker and guardian of the protesters, taking care to avoid a violent crackdown on the demonstrators while Mubaraka**s internal security forces were vilified on the streets.
• Such a light hand was not due to lack of capacity, but due to lack of need. The demonstrations provided the generals with the means to dismantle the Mubarak legacy, the biggest liability to their own livelihood, while maintaining the paramount role of the military. 
• But perhaps the most central indication that the revolution was misconstrued comes from the participation levels. On the day that Mubarak ultimately stepped down the protests reached their peak. By the most aggressive estimate only 750,000 people -- less than 1 percent of the population of densely populated Egyptian’s took to the streets. In true revolutions such as that which overthrew Communism in Central Europe or the shah in Iran, the proportion regularly breached 10 percent and on occasions even touched 50 percent. In short, Egypt’s Arab Spring was a palace coup, not a revolution.
• But the military’s Mubarak removal strategy did not come without risks. The military would much prefer to return to the days of ruling behind the scenes while leaving day to day governing to a civilian government that ultimately answers to the generals. But the political opening that the military helped to create has also greatly complicated matters: the military must now employ a much more complex balancing act at home to altogether keep the civilian government impotent, the opposition divided and foreign funding flowing toward a half-hearted democratic transition.
• With trade and tourism severely curtailed as a result of Egypta**s political unrest, the military must place extra effort in keeping up democratic appearances with the west now that the country is once against dependent upon the economic largess of outside powers. In dealing with the opposition at home, the military is no stranger to divide-and-conquer tactics and has maintained a robust intelligence service to keep tabs on already severely divided opposition.
  

5. On Hamas’ role/view on Egyptian revolution (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/309308_re-for-comment-conclusion-to-egypt-monograph-contemporary.html)

• Hamas will have to do more than a public relations campaign to break out of isolation. The Egyptian military, which shares Israel’s interest in keeping Hamas contained and the Sinai buffer clear of foreign threats, remains the biggest obstacle to Hamas’ strategic objective of dominating the Palestinian political scene without Egyptian and Israeli shackles. Hamas would like to see a political evolution in Egypt that results in an Egyptian Islamist government friendly to Hamas and hostile to Israeli interests. This is an ambitious agenda, but is one likely worth working toward from the point of view of the Hamas leadership. The best chance that Hamas has in accelerating this evolution is by creating a crisis of legitimacy for the Egyptian military by drawing the military into a conflict with Israel. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways, and there is no shortage of militant proxies that have benefited from the Egyptian military’s political distractions to expand their area of operations in the Sinai. Israel is already frustrated by the Egyptian military’s slackened control over the Sinai and tends to revert to a more preemptive regional posture when neighborhood threats cross a certain line. Add to this the potential for Iran and Syria to exercise their militant proxy options to take the attention off regime change campaigns in Damascus, and Egypt could find itself in the midst of a Sinai crisis with Israel that both sides have spent the past 33 years desperately trying to avoid.

Although this strikes me as a bit simplistic given their overarching assumption of Hamas being an offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood since, if that is the case, Hamas would also have an interest in Egypt succeeding economically in the transition so that their parent organization (the Muslim Brotherhood) could benefit from the positive sentiment.  Also, it seems to me SCAF could do a decent enough job in making sure that the MB gets the blame for any wars of aggression (i.e. we have been in control since 1973 and nothing happened – you get rid of military president and look!)

 

6. Libyan Contact – correspondences between an employee of http://www.scginternational.com/ (see website here – covers operations, logistics, intelligence, Iraq/Afghanistan, etc.) who was on the ground around September 2011…

Fred Burton: Interesting. You guys lending the opposition a hand? I would hope so.
James Smith: Certainly are. They need it. At the request of a usg committee and the rebs. Been there since no-fly.
Fred Burton: Tactical and intel support too?
James Smith: No, mainly tac ground training and psd for key figures.
Fred Burton then shares some article about potential assassintation of rebel leaders and asks if the threat is real/credible
James Smith: Completely.  Last week of August I was at a house here (32DEG 52.552'N / 13DEG 8.512'E) owned by a man last name Hakin (like the MOD Hakin but not the same man).
After midnight we recv'd ph call from anonymous caller telling him to get ready for a vehicle to come by to pick him up and take him to a pos so he could pickup some money.
    We then called a contact at MOD and ran it by them, they knew of the ruse somehow and said it was a trap aimed at the real Hakin (MOD head) and that we should vacate asap. We grabbed weapons, go-bag and moved out of the house on foot down the streets (can't drive this area due to roadblocks at every corner) to a safe(r) house. I happened to be solo that night. I moved him to the top of the house (3rd deck), barricaded the door on ground and the access to the roof, then put him down and maintained overwatch of the street below from the roof til dawn. This happens frequently here. Definite threat to NTC and lower level brigade leadership as well.

MAP of location mentioned: http://ow.ly/9WIMt

7. Hugo Chavez health issues and Venezuela transition plus some tidbits around Iran and George Friedman’s advice on how to secure a source - also, examples of how militaries all over the world enjoy their luxuries (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/202526_re-insight-venezuela-update-on-chavez-s-health-power.html)

• Guess who has been most cooperative with us lately? The military elite. These guys have been living the good life. They love women... lots of women. THey love booze. They love bora bora. They are easy to bribe. They dont care about chavez. they care about maintaining their current lifestyles. We've seen a lot of these military elite reach out to us lately, trying to insulate themselves in a post-Chavez scenario.
• This is why you'll see Chavez investing a lot of time and money in developing the militia. They're his best insurance policy. The more of a problem the militia can create on the streets, the more the military elite will hestiate before acting against him or his potential successor.
  
• The intent of the ley de precios is very simple. The money laundering schemes in food, pharmaceuticals, energy parts, etc. etc. have gotten worse./ Completely unchecked. This price controls law is the government's way of controlling opposition campaign spending. Very straightforward - they have the legal justification to intimidate corporations into cutting back their support for the opposition, or else, their company is taken over. This will allow the state more control of the private sector.
• we were talking a bit about a recent PdVSA-Iran joint venture. They shifted their main base of operations from Caracas to Ankara, though. This has become a trend lately, where a lot of Iran's sanctions circumventing oeprations in VZ are quietly being relocated to Turkey. Part of Turkey's balancing act with Iran.
• Remember that there are four key players propping up the regime - China, Cuba, Russia, Iran. All four are split on how to manage a post-Chavez regime.
• From George Friedman himself: If this is a source you suspect may have value, you have to take control od him. Control means financial, sexual or psychological control to the point where he would reveal his sourcing and be tasked.
  

8. Feeling that global elite are lost.  http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1116544_re-insight-for-internal-use-only-on-pain-of-agony-.html  These emails are from 2010 and also have much discussion about Kissinger believing Iran is about to go to war which obviously turned out to be false…

• One sense I'm getting here is that the American elite, along with Europe's, China's and just about everyone but Russia's his suffering from three problems: First, none are really aware of the political pressures on other elites. Second, they completely misunderstand the alienation of the publics, three, except for Volcker, they think this can be handled by the elites among themselves. We have a crisis of the elites, in my view.
• Friedman: Turkey would break with israel and the united states. It would be an opportunity erdogan is looking for.  Iran would become more visible but not more powerful. A year after the attack its underlying weakness would still be there and its dependence on turkey greater.  In my view the ourtcome of this is turkish power. But remeber, my insight is not that israel will attack. Its that Kissinger thinks they will attack. Huge difference.
  

9. Halliburton alleged dirty games (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/5417564_sam-kent-and-halliburton-.html)

• I had lunch yesterday in Houston with former-Federal Judge Sam Kent (the first Federal Judge found guilty of serious crimes in the US) and he told me why he thinks he was prosecuted. (For those who haven't followed this, he was found guilty on perjury & sexual misconduct. Yes, he slept with those two women, but it was consensual - they were old affairs and long over.)
• What Sam said was that "isn't is strange that the Justice Department begins sniffing around for dirt to throw at me just weeks after I ruled a heavy case against Halliburton. Then a small set of affairs turn into an untrue situation and then spun up into an unprecedented case against a Federal Judge."
• Of course, I told him he was nuts to rule anything against Halliburton. I also told him that this sounds like a John Grisham plotline.

10. Crazy discussion about Israeli commandos using Kurdish elements (or Jewish citizens) within Iran to bomb nuclear infrastructure in November, 2011? (http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/185945_re-alpha-s3-g3-israel-iran-barak-hails-munitions-blast-in.html)

• Chain starts of with news reports of blasts in Iran (confirmed by Iran) and quotes Ehud Barak: “I don't know the extent of the explosion," he told military radio, asked about the incident. "But it would be desirable if they multiply."
• Then, a source claims: “I think this [push for war] is a diversion. The Israelis already destroyed all the Iranian nuclear infrastructure on the ground weeks ago. The current "let's bomb Iran" campaign was ordered by the EU leaders to divert the public attention from their at home financial problems. It plays also well for the US since Pakistan, Russia and N. Korea are mentioned in the report.  The result of this campaign will be massive attacks on Gaza and strikes on Hezbollah in both Lebanon and Syria.”
• When asked to clarify response, source re-confirmed, saying: Israeli commandos in collaboration with Kurd forces destroyed few underground facilities mainly used for the Iranian defense and nuclear research projects.  Despite the reports in the media and against any public knowledge, the promoter of a massive Israeli attack on Syria is the axis India-Russia-Turkey-Saudi Arabia. The axis US-Germany-France-China is against such an attack from obvious reasons. Not many people know that Russia is one of Israel's largest military partners and India is Israel's largest client. If a direct conflict between Iran and Israel erupts, Russia and Saudi Arabia will gain the advantages on oil increasing prices. On the other hand, China and Europe are expected to loose from an oil crisis as a result of a conflict. Based on Israeli plans, the attack on Iran will last only 48 hours but will be so destructive that Iran will be unable to retaliate or recover and the government will fall. It is hard to believe that Hamas or Hezbollah will try to get involved in this conflict.  In the open media many are pushing and expecting Israel to launch a massive attack on Iran. Even if the Israelis have the capabilities and are ready to attack by air, sea and land, there is no need to attack the nuclear program at this point after the commandos destroyed a significant part of it.  If a massive attack on Iran happens soon, then the attack will have political and oil reasons and not nuclear. It is also very hard to believe that the Israelis will initiate an attack unless they act as a contractor for other nations or if Iran or its proxies attack first. With the revealed of the new UN report the Israelis have green light to take care of the Iranian proxies in Gaza and Lebanon now with the entire world watching Iran. I think that we should expect escalations on these fronts rather than an Israeli attack on Iran.
• Continued discussion: Ah. As stick said, they would more likely use proxies. But if not, special operations forces do often move undetected. Don't think of them as going in on a helicopter, think of them as going in with a group of migrant workers crossing the border.  There used to be a lot of jews in Iran, not so much anymore, that's who I would recruit form.
• Response: There are still about 20,000 Jews in Iran (Tehran and Esfahan mostly), but IMO, they are far too scared of being accused as Israeli spies too actually help Israel out.
• After someone cites Stuxnet as an analogous previous Israeli attack: Penetrating a major military installation and causing a blast is a totally different ballgame. Not saying it can't happen. But we can't assume that because they did stuxnet that they are capable of doing this blast as well. It is a huge leap in capabilities.
• And finally Fred Burton closes with: “p.s. I'm offended that we may believe an Iranian before a Jew”

11. STRATFOR’s Middle East source (Lebanese military apparently) and a Hamas member gave this overview of Syria (http://english.al-akhbar.com/gi-files/iran-reaching-out-us-post-assad-set-me1-and-me1386) claiming that Iran is reaching out to the US on controlled regime change

Date 2011-12-13 16:02:19

From [email protected]

To [email protected]

Others MessageId: <[email protected]>

InReplyTo: [email protected]

Text

Reva's note - this is extremely interesting, especially the bolded part below. DOes Iran really think it can convince the US to collaborate with them on regime change in SYria in such a way that will end up in Iran's favor? the whole point of the US focusing in on Syria is to contain Iran in the first place. This sounds like the Iranians are getting to be in an increasingly desperate position. Always be wary of source bias, but why would a HZ source want to spread info on the weakness of the Syrian regime and the lack of options for Iran? I do believe the part about Iran preferring a palace coup over the Turkish strategy of building up an opposition via FSA.

SOURCE: ME1 and ME1386
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: ME1 and member of Hamas politburo
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva

Marhaba Reva,

I strongly believe that Asad's regime will fall in 2012. The conventional wisdom that Asad will survive, because both Iran and Israel view him with favor, is a thing of the past. The situation in Syria has reached the point of no return. It is true than nine months of demonstrations have not brought down the regime but, by the same token, regime brutality and heavy handedness have not quelled the uprising. If anything, the level of hostilities and army defections is on the rise.

The breaking point will come when the military establishment realizes that Asad must go. There are signs that the military establishment is beginning to disintegrate. I talked to [ME1386] and he told me that Alawite officers and enlisted men are beginning to join the ranks of the FSA. This represents a major development. Alawite officers are divided since many of them are unhappy about the use of excessive force against Sunni protesters. Alawite officers are aware that Asad is trying to find an asylum for himself and his family should his regime become unslavageable. This is upsetting many Alawites who are coming to realize that Asad will abandon them. If so, they reason that it would be suicidal to continue to win the wrath of the Sunnis. Walid al-Muallim offered to resign but Asad turned down his request. This is a clear indicator that many of Asad's men are realizing that they are putting a vain fight against the burgeoning uprising.

The Iranians are weighing in the situation in Syria very carefully. One must read beyond the public statements of the Iranians, especially ayatollah Khamenei. Both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad have concluded that Asad's regime cannot be rescued. It is perfectly understood that the regime in Damascus will fall along lines similar to the Libyan model. There will have to be a coup in Damascus, be it a military or political one.

One must not dismiss the pragmatism of Khamenei. Iran appears to be willing to use its influence in Syria to stage a coup, provided that it is able to ensure that the new leadership will continue to pursue excellent relations with Tehran. The Iranians have approached the Americans on this. In the past, Iran collaborated with the U.S. on the ouster of Saddam Hussein and Iran won big in Iraq. The Iranians would not mind working again on ousting Asad if they can secure good results in Syria. Syria's contiguity to Iraq allows Iran to play a direct role in the affairs of Damascus.

The Iranians feel they need to act on Syria soon because the Turks have their own plans for Syria and are not coordinating with the Iranians. He says the Turks are moving slowly but systematically. Iran does not want to allow Turkey to take over Syria. Whereas the Turks are coordinating with the Brotherhood and the FSA, the Iranians prefer a palace coup in damascus in order to maintain their ties with Asad's successors. What is delaying action in Syria is the fact that the U.S. has not yet decided on the shape of the post-Asad political system. Nevertheless, he insists that Asad's regime will fall, although the future of Syria after the regime change remains nebulous.

12. Other:

• Interesting case of Wachovia (seemingly knowingly) participating in the handling of $125B of Mexican drug money each year between 2004-2007 with penalty of paying federal authorities $110m in forfeiture, for allowing transactions later proved to be connected to drug smuggling, and incurred a $50m fine for failing to monitor cash used to ship 22 tons of cocaine.” (The total fine was less than 2% of the bank's $12.3bn profit for 2009. On 24 March 2010, Wells Fargo stock traded at $30.86 - up 1% on the week of the court settlement.) http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1115826_re-us-bank-dirty-money-.html
• Interesting correspondence around Flotilla sabatoge… Notihng groundbreaking but just clearly they are supportive of Israel’s position (i.e. writing “Nice move” when the sabotage was successful and “there's gotta be some rich Turkey or qatari or hollywood actor who just gets a kick out of telling his rich friends that one of his boats is involved in supporting the cause of the repressed palestinian peoples”).  Additionally, STRATFOR seem to have little/no connection to Arab government insiders (other than the ME1 contact within the Lebanese military) but very brazenly ask “Should I ask the IDF?”  Also, this post contains a reference to an “IDF document” that was circulated last week so clearly they are getting intel directly somehow (http://english.al-akhbar.com/gi-files/activists-israel-sabotaged-irish-vessel-too)
• Democrats ballot stuffing: pretty interesting
  a.    http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/339396_re-insight-the-dems-and-dirty-tricks-internal-use-only-pls.html
  b.   http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/347043_insight-mccain-5-internal-use-only-pls-do-
        not-forward-.html
  

For aggregation of previous polls please see: www.ducoht.org/polls.html

Executive Summary of Arabic Opinion Index poll with more results to be released (although there is apparently a 90-page document sent out to researchers)....

The survey in question was conducted during 2011 in 12 Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza), Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. It was carried out via multi-staged cluster samples representative of the societies included, with a margin of error not exceeding 3.5 percent. Overall, some 16,173 respondents were interviewed, with the assistance of several Arab research centers.

Support for Arab Revolutions

Most Arab citizens support the Arab revolutions:

• 70 percent of respondents supported the protests that ended the rule of former Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, 
• 80 percent express support for the protests which ousted former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. 
• (Respondents in Saudi Arabia were not asked their opinion of the Egyptian revolution; likewise, respondents in Sudan were not asked about either the Egyptian or the Tunisian revolutions.)
• The vast majority of respondents from Egypt and Tunisia said they believed that within three years, their countries’ situations would be better than they were during the reigns of Mubarak and Ben Ali.

Arabs and Democracy

The survey’s results show democracy to be well-rooted in Arab public opinion. Most respondents (81 percent) were able to detail a meaningful, substantive type of democratic system which they would accept as fitting their needs.

Arab citizens focus on political aspects when defining democracy: the respondents emphasized the following as important to the functioning of a democracy:

• political pluralism, 
• the protection of political and civil liberties
• social justice
• transfer of power, 
• 12 percent of respondents emphasized the importance of matters related to economic and social development, security and stability in democracy.

Support for Democracy is high

• More than two-thirds support a democratic system and see it as the best system, “even if imperfect”, 
• 15 percent of respondents oppose democracy
  
• However, 36% wouldn't support those whom they disagree with in political platform to take power

Religion and Politics

• Most respondents described themselves as either “very religious” or “religious to a certain extent,” 
  
• 71 percent report that their interactions with others – economic, human, political or social – are not affected by whether or not their interlocutor is religious non-religious (whether or not that person is religiously observant
• A strong plurality, 47 percent, supports the argument that “religious practices are private practices and should be separated from public life and politics,” against 38 percent who oppose it.
• Public opinion regarding this principle of the separation of religion from politics is divided, as shown by the survey results, despite the fact that the same principle is strongly in evidence when it comes to practical demands: two-thirds of respondents, as reported above, being opposed to the idea of clerical interference in politics, rejecting the idea that clerics be able to influence voting by the public or matters of government policy.

Confidence in State institutions:

• 77 percent express confidence in their armies, 
• half feel the same about their countries’ general security apparatus (a term which is variably the police or the state security services). 
• 57 percent expressed confidence in the judicial system 
• less than half of respondents have confidence in their governments (47 percent) 
• 36 percent express confidence in the parliaments

Views on country legislative branches:

• 30 percent were satisfied with their parliaments (however, to put this in perspective about 11% of Americans approve of their parliament – “congress” – performance http://ow.ly/9A99a)
• 31 percent of respondents see their countries’ economic policies as taking their views into consideration 
• 34 percent believe that their countries’ foreign policies express their opinions. 
  

Corruption and fairness

• 83 percent feel that financial and administrative corruption is very widespread, as opposed to only 4 percent who believe that it is not prevalent, 
• Most respondents expressing the view that their countries’ legal code is not equally applied to all citizens (“justice is not blind” in Arab countries, one could say).

Arab Unity

• (71 percent) believe that the population of the Arab world represents a single nation, 
  
• 50% firmly believe that  that the peoples of this nation are distinguished from each other by particular characteristics and features
• This contrasts with a mere 17 percent of respondents who see the various peoples in different Arab states as being tied by only weak, tenuous bonds.
• Public opinion in the Arab region largely supports an increase in cooperation among Arab countries; additionally, it supports taking necessary actions that are unifying in nature, including the establishment of joint Arab military forces, in addition to individual countries’ respective armies, the abolition of customs and tariffs on trade among Arab countries, and the unification of monetary systems with the aim of creating a single Arab currency.
• 84 percent believe that the Palestinian cause is an issue which unites all Arabs, not only the Palestinians.
• The perception of a single nation is reinforced by the ability of most respondents (81 percent) to name countries that represent a source of threat to the security of the Arab homeland; there was little notable opposition to the concept of there being a possible threat to something like the “Arab homeland,” serving to further highlight the acceptance of Arab-ness amongst the people of these countries.

Israel, US, and others

• 73 percent of respondents believe that Israel and the United States are the two countries that most threaten the security of the Arab world
• Followed by Iran at 5 percent (further reinforces tons of polls that point to the same – the Shiite/Sunni divide, in my opinion, is largely driven by governments and not so much the people)
• 84 percent reject government recognition of Israel, including in countries whose governments have signed peace agreements w/ Israel, while only 10 percent support it
• Arab-Israeli peace agreements enjoy support from just 21 percent of respondents

Over the past several years Turkey has emerged as the darling of the Arab world with its direct confrontation of Israel killing its civilians and it’s tough stance on Syria.  The government of Turkey attempted to broker an agreement between IAEA and Tehran regarding its nuclear program and stood up for Palestinian rights with Erdogan confronting Peres about the Gaza massacre during the World Economic Forum.  Most importantly, unlike false bravado we have seen in the rest of the Arab region, this is reinforced by strong economic growth (not just at macro level GDP figures but with wealth increasing across most levels of society), domestic stability and increased political openness.  I believe this is the result of increasing civilian control of government and, through understanding how Turkey got to this point, we can learn from their experience and avoid their mistakes.

Kamel Ataturk formed the modern Turkish republic following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and, although he was a military officer himself, he actively endeavored to limit the military’s role in politics – most explicitly by a decree in 1930 that prohibited active officers from holding political positions.  After the coups d'état in 1960, the National Unity Committee established the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces in 1961 to legitimize military interventions in politics – thus placing it in a similar position to what Egypt was in post-1952.  However, the countries have diverged over the past decade.  Much like Mubarak’s Egypt, Turkey tended to blindly support Western programs and concede to Western requests and while Egypt was under the tutelage of the US, Turkey’s drive was a mad desire – particularly on the part of the military – to join the EU.  While I will not go into why this shift occurred per se, two key factors are the hurt dignity of the Turkish people being repeatedly rebuffed by the EU and the relatively weak economic growth both resulting from lack of accountability at top levels. In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Erdogan took nearly 2/3rds of parliament seats and over the past decade has cemented its control on government and wrestled power away from the generals.  A few telling harbingers are that the new defense minister and deputy defense minister are former AKP party members, Turkish withdrawal of its ambassador from and severing of military ties with Israel and, most spectacularly, the arrest of over 40 generals who were allegedly plotting a coup to remove Erdogan from power.  Moreover, the AKP’s rise has been accomplished not through force, backroom deals, cronyism but rather through full transparency and enabling the populace to trust, and have faith in, their government.

The beneficial results of ceding power from the military are numerous.  Most importantly, the people in control are now fully accountable to their populace – previously the military (through constitutional dictate that they imposed after some of the four coups in the past 30 years) was allowed to intervene in Turkish politics to preserve the secular nature of government – specifically stating that "the Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey”.   In reality what this meant was the military was able to consistently secure its own privileges – threatening any civilian government who attempted to advance the country in face of military interests with immediate removal manifested most recently in 1997 with the removal of elected prime minister Necmettin Erbakan (they executed Turkey’s first democratically elected prime minister, Adnan Menderes, in 1960).  While the reasons why this is not a sustainable system are numerous, I believe the key point is the lack of accountability.

Accountability is defined as having to face consequences as a result of your actions – without this it is hard to correct the path one is on and ensure consistent re-guidance.  Rather, the absence of accountability (i.e. no elections) enables one to perpetuate incorrect action – moreover, when this lack of accountability is extended to criticism too (i.e. media restrictions) then not only are leaders not self correcting but they tend to be unaware of their failures.  Unfortunately, politics globally has taught us that political parties tend to desire perpetuation of their control/rule and – barring some reworking of human nature – we cannot change that.  However, what we can change is the incentive structure.  The merits of democracies are that, in order to perpetuate power, a party has to deliver results to its citizens or else next election cycle the opponents will capitalize on that failure and potentially win office.  In the systems  setup in Egypt, there was little correlation between delivering results to citizens and staying in power.  The NDP just had to ensure that its party members would remain loyal and that they did not step on the toes of the military; as long as they kept both those groups happy there was little fear of them being shaken. In fact some political observers argue that, in reality, it was Gamal Mubarak’s encroachment on the military's economic benefits that was the crucial factor in the Mubarak’s and NDP’s downfall.

One may argue that the Turkish model served the country well for many decades and set the stage for the current transition they are undergoing today – however, there are three key differences in Egypt’s case.

First of all, practically speaking, the Egyptian military has many differences with the Turkish that would make the lead-up to transition much rougher.  From the onset, the Turkish military showed a progressive outlook for the underlying vision of their nation. The Egyptian military, while not evil, lacks that driving force and - as a result - is more so driven by selfish motivations to maintain their hold on power/finances. In essence, the army is willing to give power to civilians only as long as the army is assured its economic interests; as such, the initial discord with the NDP arose - not due to underlying allegiance to citizen/nation - but rather because of Gamal's aggressive economic agenda (e.g. privatization of banks) that wrested some of the military's economic control.  In reality, the officers seem only interested in stability, maintaining their economic interests, and preserving the legitimacy of the armed forces despite having been the backbone of a thoroughly discredited regime for 60 years. As a result, the SCAF seems to be willing to hand over power to anyone who can guarantee those three interests.

Second, philosophically speaking, there is no reason to believe that Turkey could not have achieved this same result several decades ago had the people stood up to the military and on the side of civilian government – despite potential disagreements with some details of various political groups, the people (Egyptian or Turkish) need to support the independence of a civilian government.  Moreover, given SCAF’s conditions for civilian control, allowing them to perpetuate control and limit civilian government to their liking would be disastrous and lead us to a Mubarak 2.0 (not forgetting that they supported v1.0 for decades).

Finally, most commentators believe it is EU demands on Turkey that led to the gradual transition to civilian power – a constraint that the Egyptian military does not face.  Turkey’s democratic changes, which remain far from complete, happened despite the military, not because of it.  This is most evident in the effect EU demands have had on the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, considered the institutionalization of the Turkish military’s influence over politics) a body that can be considered very similar to today’s SCAF.  Based on the Copenhagen criteria – requirements for Turkey to enter EU negotiations – the Turkish parliament passed a number of reforms, most recently in 2003 with the “seventh reform package” which most importantly made it possible to appoint a civilian head to the MKG, limited their control of media (radio and TV) and disbanded its Public Relations Command which covertly influenced public opinion by issuing public statements on political developments and government actions.

Let us realize the benefits Turkey is enjoying and, through understanding the reasons why, be more driven to demanding accountability of our government.  In most democratic nations military budgets are in the public domain, national security issues are subject to parliamentary oversight, and, they key difference: the military executes, rather than makes, national security policy – therefore, having foreign policy under the purview of the public.  

After 8 Turks were killed by Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza flotilla incident, the embassy in Ankara was not stormed.  While there were "dozens" of stone throwing individuals - there was not wholesale craze as we witnessed on 9/9/2011 because the Turkish people knew their government would stand up for their citizens blood - in Egypt citizens felt they needed to make sure Israel heard Egyptian complaints since they had no faith that the SCAF would do so. 

When governments in the Middle East (and around the world) say that protesters are operating under foreign agendas and protesting for money, etc - it always strikes me as odd the transparency that these regimes offer vs what is offered by those that they throw allegations at. 

Anyway - regarding the baseless allegations.. Compare the two clips above and the questions/quotes that arise:

Iranian Propaganda Video (youtube link)
Two questions that arise for me are: 

1. How come this type of conspiracy theory does not apply to the Arab government supporters? (i.e. intellectuals, propaganda, TV, radio, etc.) 
   
2. Is there not one Western intellectual who may disagree and not play along? 
3. Is there not one Arab intellectual/journalists who cares about his country enough to not facilitate its colonization?
   
4. What does it say about the Arab youth and general citizenry if they are willing to conspire with any foreign element to cause disorder and neo-colonization? 
   
   

The last question is something that I have struggled with.  Even if the government does not believe the allegations of being a foreign agent, it disturbs me that many of my fellow compatriots readily believe this allegation when thrown at any of our youth.  However, it becomes more obvious why they think this if one assesses the word 'citizen'.  It is defined as an individual belonging to society with associated rights and responsibilities.  Given that historically we have had little/no rights then, by definition, there is little expectation for fulfilling any societal responsibilities (streets clean, no corruption, etc.) - the most extreme of this is being a traitor, when one is driven to forgo his/her own people for financial gain.  The most frustrating thing for me though is how Jewish Israelis can travel to Sinai, Egypt, anywhere they are allowed and the Israeli government does not automatically assume they are spies and interrogate them, given them a hard time, etc. - however, if any Egyptian were to visit Israel (or even Palestine proper) I think we all know the suspicions that would arise from fellow the government and, consequently, fellow citizens. 

At the end of the day, the Egyptian government during Jan25 protests was trying to peddle the message that the people in Tahrir squared are betraying their country for a KFC meal... The real question arises though: If one is willing to betray their country for some fried chicken, then what society do we really have??

Gene Sharp Interview (full video link here)

While you should watch the whole interview in the link above (it is around 1 hr 20min, but if you have a video program put it at 1.2 speed, it's still comprehensible and saves some time).  Anyway, the above clip I selected simply in response to the above allegations by the Iranian regime (and various other governments when they speak out against protesters).  Gene Sharp clearly advocates "RELY ON YOURSELVES ALONE  - DON'T DEPEND ON SOMEONE ELSE COMING TO SAVE YOU, THEY MAY NEVER GET THERE AND THEY MAY COME WITH SHACKLES AS WELL"   

Moreover, he speaks out against the CIA, foreign government's interests, etc. While one can claim this is all talk, he has also written books to that regard (i.e. the Anti-Coup which can be applied to the CIA-puppet governments in the 1960s-1990s in Latin America).  Finally, to top it all off, he even has writing on civilian based defense and how to prevent war, etc.  (i.e. he is agianst the military-industrial complex which I believe is what all of the corpiracy thoritests understand is driving the NWO, Masonic Groups, FreeMasons, etc.)  Maybe it is all a facade and his life work was all a cover up and his real motives are in support of the CIA and that military-industrial complex. Maybe.

First of all, it strikes me as funny how the people they accuse (e.g. Gene Sharp and George Soros) are frequently on TV and in conferences discussing their works, messages, etc. (just saw George Soros interviewed on Fareed Zakaria a few weeks back see HERE).  

Some quotes/ideas I liked from the discussion with Mr. Sharp:

• It's a great advantage to know what you don't know - because it is an opportunity to learn, if you want to & if you are not arrogant"
• The key was in studying the sources of power, what is power, what is the nature of revolutions and dictatorships..
• 25:00 "Because you are non-violent, don't assume your opponent will be also.  There are people who naively assume that - its pure romanticism" Gene Sharp 
• 25:19 "Dictators do not like the people to learn that they have power potential" 
• 26:00 People sometimes justify violence: because we are getting killed, we might as well do something. Just know that is a suicidal step you are taking, because your enemy always has greater power for violent than you do.  So don't be stupid, don't do the thing he wants you to do, because he knows he can crush you if you go over to violence. That's why the political police put agents into the resistance groups " Gene Sharp
• They [regimes] always have the military option, non-violence just makes it harder for them to use it
• Lord Stephen King Hall (1957-1959): general in the British military who advocated nonviolent resistance to defend against invaders and occupiers (i.e. can be a national policy that protects a country)
• There are sources of power - these sources are uncertain! you can regulate the degree to which the regime gets those sources of power - if you can shrink the availability of those sources of power by restricting the obedience and cooperation of the people and of institutions - then the power of that regime, however dictatorial, will be limited and potentially cut off.  (40:38?)
• Something so simple as distributing a banned book - that is part of gnawing away at the foundations of that illegitimate regime - in this case, namely the lies and propaganda. Very simply - terrifyingly simple to the regime.
• Question: Why do you think it was successful? 
  Gene Sharp: We didn't expect that - I thought that the end of the Burmese edition thats it.  These other things just started happenings and we dont know exactly how they happened (he had previously been discussing some of the individual activists who translated and transported the writings).  I think its been successful because people have been quietly desperate, they have been hungry... Is there something that can be done so we do not suffer these terrible plights that people before us for several decades have been suffering?  That we don't have to go through another war with all that distribution that ends up killing more people than it could be supposedly saving.  It was the hunger for that.
• We were surprised - people were writing to us, I don't know how many people, sayiung the same thing: "we thought this was written for us."  And from totally different countries, religious groups, societies - the piece is now in four indiginous African languages.  
• Non-violence scares regimes, it is harder to attack a non-violent movement's legitimacy because when people are sacrificing their lives not only for a better life but for higher principles - it is hard to doubt their faith.
• You need to illustrate the solidarity of the people - that scares them, and you need to think through how to do this effectively.
• "Internal issues with the power dynamics are very important and can really mess up a movement - there will be groups looking to take over the group for their own political purpose.  There are other who have the unanimity policy and - to me - that is nonsense and is disruptive to the, for example, occupy movements in the US in my opinion - although I am not an authority on those movements.  That is a knowledge that needs to be studied/developed and would be very useful."
• 1:00:30 Discusses the negative of Western government involvement in the coups and his distrust of the CIA....
• 1:03:00 discussion of corporate America, fake democracies, worry of revolutionary regimes being authoritarian as well, solutions to internal discord.
• "Individuals cannot get rid of dictators.  just being good or committed is not enough, you have to work with other people - you have to get rid of the sources of power.  The source of power are not made available by individuals, they are by group s and by institutions."
• You do not get rid of regimes/war by confronting - you need to undermine it.  More importantly, you need to have an alternative that is credible.  You get rid of regimes by not needing them anymore."  (Chapters of that in his book Sources of Power and Political Freedom)
• On mix of violence and non-violence (i.e. different groups in Syria): "It is what the oppressor wants, because the violence will spread - it is confident and equpiied and prepared to use the regimes violence which is much gfreater than anything the rebel can produce." 
• 1:13:00 Libya-related: Interesting hypothesis about Yunan Luis as an agent provaceteur put by Gaddagi to push for violent rebel opposition being supported by NATO.  Outcome is that: 1. there is intense violence there today when compared with Egypt and Tunisia 2. It took longer than it did in Egypt and Tunisia 3. Brought in foreign forces which delegitimized the opposition 4. he ws killed  mysteriously two weeks later 6. Two weeks propr to his flipping gaddafi and son predicted civil war (its flimsy but an interesting take - i.e. he hypothesizes that non-violence would have had better long-term outcome for Libya)

I am planning to meet with Mr. Gene Sharp in a few weeks to discuss options that non-violent protesters have during this transition period to ensure sustained pressure on authoritarian forces (i.e. SCAF) while not alienating larger society (i.e. most polls show that citizens desire martial law to deal with criminals and that they view protests unfavorably).  I would greatly appreciate any additional questions that 

Just as an unnecessary addition relating to the first video, I thoroughly dislike MEMRI and hate using their clip here given their appalling ability to nitpick on the smallest detail of negative Arab media yet I do not think (and pls correct me if I am wrong) I have ever seen anything shown of negative Israeli propoganda - whose effects can be seen HERE.

In theory a good start but, of course, little/no details provided by government it seems... Any more info on the below? 

Given even very recent abuse (see here) and the potential of our police to be used as a tool of the regime in power, this is a key priority... (Some brief notes and links on the Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim can be found here)

From State Information Service: (official government)   http://ow.ly/9apvb
Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim asserted on Saturday 18/2/2012 that the ministry has taken the initiative to restructure its departments in a way that fits the nature of the current conditions in Egypt after the revolution.

The Police have their honorable patriotic history in Egypt and used to upright conduct and punctuality in both behavior and appearance, the Minister affirmed, adding that the police have the objective standards that are able to correct any mistake and abolish any negative aspect in the post-revolution phase and bring any individual involved in any act of negligence.

The Police have changed their security philosophy, slogan and work approach and are maintaining the stability and security of Egypt.

From Masry al Youm: http://ow.ly/9apsT

Freedom and Justice, the mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, leads with the headline, “Interior Ministry purged.” Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim has declared that various committees are being formed to restructure the ministry, adding that officers and soldiers have donated one day’s salary as a contribution to Egypt’s economy and a symbol of their love to their country. The article does not specify where these donations will go.

MP Farid Ismail, head of Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee and a Freedom and Justice Party member, agreed to the restructuring decision, according to the party paper. Ismail recently declared that a committee had been formed to question 805 Interior Ministry staff members who are allegedly implicated in crimes.

In the paper, Ismail also denied a “rumor” published by Al-Masry Al-Youm that FJP asked for an entire class of police graduates to be selected from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, saying Al-Masry Al-Youm’s article was a continuation of the newspaper’s policy of tarnishing the Brotherhood’s reputation.   

Came across this article a few days ago.  It is an account of musician Mohammed Jamal's (Salalem band) unjustified arrest and (by definition) unjustified abuse at the hands of state security.  Some tidbits are extracted below but the full article is available here.  

I hope that he continues to pursue the officers who are to blame because, until they feel they are held accountable for their actions, they will continue with these disgusting practices and continue to serve the next person in power with little regards to the people they should actually be serving - the people who pay their salaries - the citizens.

• We were heading home one night after our concert at the Cairo Jazz Club, where we had performed with the Canadian singer NEeMA, when we approached an ordinary police checkpoint. The police signalled for us to pull over and politely asked to see my driving licence and our identification cards – which we handed over, also politely. They then asked to search the car and search us and, out of politeness, we let them. After they were done and had not found anything illegal or suspicious on us, they allowed us to continue on our way, and we did.Add Sticky Note | Remove
• Shortly after I drove off, I realised that I hadn’t taken back my ID card from the police officer who had searched us. Just to be certain, we searched the car first for the card, and when we couldn’t find it, we decided to return to retrieve it.
• Back at the checkpoint, we tried to find the policemen who had searched the car (it was busy and there were a lot of cars being checked over). When I found the officer in question, he insisted that he had given it back to me and then asked me to park because I was blocking the traffic and that he would come and search the car with me for it. Meanwhile, Walkman had wandered off to ask other if they have seen my ID. As I was searching the car with the officer, Walkman innocently asked another policeman about my ID, which he somehow took personally as an accusation of theft and proceeded, with a gang of other coppersm to kick and punch Walkman. When I came to Walkman’s aid, the police turned mercilessly on me too.
• After a long session of beatings, we were dragged to a waiting police car. They confiscated my car and our phones. On the way to the police station, a police officer handed me my ID and told me, “Here you go, your card”. When we reached the station, we were already in complete shock and awe from what had just happened to us – something we had never experienced before. They walked us to a room in which there was a miserable, low-ranking officer from the remnants of the former regime. No one touched us in the police station but they were very generous with the swearing and insults.
• We were also accompanied by a large number of serious criminals, many of whom seemed to be friends with the cops and they all had a laugh together.
• The officer then approached us and said, “Fuck the revolution that made you think you could mistreat police officers. Why the fuck am I being drained on the streets all day. Isn’t it for you? What a fucking revolution.” He then sent his colleague off to write a police report to “screw us” with. The other officer then opened a drawer and got out a big knife, a bar of hashish, and some paper and left.
• We later learnt that they hqd fabricated a police report accusing us of possessing two grams of hashish, a big knife, and attacking a police officer while on duty.
• We were eventually taken to a middle-ranking police officer who was very respectful. He apologised to us when he heard the story and knew we were respectable people but he all he managed to do was to order the guard to keep us apart from the serious criminals until we were transferred in the morning to the prosecutor’s office.
• Handcuffed, we were taken to the prosecutor’s office in a police van full of criminals
• A decent lawyer came to our aid and the prosecutor was also very respectful. He tried to explain that what had happened was because we looked “weird” and that our attitude as musicians might have provoked the officer. Unfortunately, that’s the mindset many in the police force have. We were released on LE400 bail and now Walkman and I are charged with three quite serious crimes.