From the Congressional Research Services and the US Government Accountability Office (note: two hopes of mine are to get an accountability office & Freedom of Information Act in Egypt) an overview that should illustrate US views on AID to Egypt, how it differs between economic/military and the propensity to cut each type.  Keep in mind, this was during a time when Bush was actively looking to pursue his “freedom agenda” so, if there was any time that they would cut military aid, it would have been then – and you can read below how successful those attempts are.  (It is interesting that almost every proposal to cut USAID to Egypt came from Obey of Wisconsin – wonder why, can’t imagine a large Egyptian constituency there.)  Bottom line is that, if I were SCAF I wouldn't fear a cut to military AID based on current discourse from DoD and State Department, coupled with historical inability of congress to execute on threats!

Before going into the congressional views on USAID – I think this little footnote listed in one of the documents is particularly enlightening:

“According to U.S. defense officials, Egypt only allocates the minimum amount of FMF funds necessary for follow on maintenance, resulting in inadequate support for weapon system sustainment.”  Couple this with the repeated allegations in wikileaks that the Egyptian military was NOT preparing to face modern day challenges, their focus on private economic enterprises and the reports of Tantawi's inabilities - two conclusions arise:

1.       Our military is probably in disarray (most figures put USAID to military at ~1/3 of total budget – although budgetary figures range quite a bit so if we aren't maintaining those systems then not much of a chance that we are doing a good job with others).

2.       The above is not due to lack of resources or capabilities but rather that the generals in charge today enjoy the economic benefits from these types of deals with the last thing in their minds is fighting a war – let alone with the one country we are allegedly preparing for…

2006 Report:  As you can see from the below, the military aid is safe (one bill had less than 20% approval) whereas economic assistance is  far more likely to be axed – also, when money is needed elsewhere it comes out of Egypt’s economic package, not the military…

An amendment offered on July 15, 2004, to the House FY2005 foreign operations bill (H.R. 4818) would have reduced U.S. military aid to Egypt by $570 million and increased economic aid by the same amount, but the amendment failed by a vote of 131 to 287. An amendment offered on June 28, 2005, to the House FY2006 foreign operations bill (H.R. 3057) would have reduced U.S. military aid to Egypt by $750 million and would have transferred that amount to child survival and health programs managed by USAID. The amendment failed by a recorded vote of 87 to 326.

On May 25, 2006, the House Appropriations Committee in a voice vote rejected an amendment to cut $200 million in military aid to Egypt during markup of H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill.  In June 2006, the House narrowly defeated an amendment (198-225) to H.R. 5522 that would have reallocated $100 million in economic aid to Egypt and used it instead to fight AIDS worldwide and to assist the Darfur region of Sudan. Many supporters of the amendment were dismayed by the Egyptian government’s spring 2006 crackdown on pro-democracy activists in Cairo.  Representative David Obey of Wisconsin sponsored both amendments.

2007 Document: For years, Congress has specified in annual Foreign Operations appropriations legislation that ESF funds to Egypt are provided with the understanding that Egypt undertake certain economic reforms and liberalize its economy.  More recently, however, Congress has begun to attach conditions to Egyptian assistance intended to support the political reform process.  The FY2006 Foreign Operations

appropriations (P.L. 109-102), for example, designated $100 million in economic aid for education and democracy and governance programming.  The conference report on the FY2006 spending measure (H.Rept. 109-265) stated that “not less than 50 percent of the funds for democracy, governance and human rights be provided through non-governmental organizations for the purpose of strengthening Egyptian civil society organizations, enhancing their participation in the political process and their ability to promote and monitor human rights.”

Although the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee draft bill fully funds the Administration’s $1.76 billion Egyptian aid package for FY2007, Representative Obey, ranking Member of the Appropriations

Committee, offered an amendment at the full Committee markup to reduce military assistance to Egypt by $200 million.  Under the amendment, a certain portion of military aid would be limited until Egypt improves its record on human rights, detention of democracy activists, election procedures, and other matters.  A Kolbe amendment, that passed by voice vote, rescinded $200 million in previously

appropriated but unspent funds to Egypt until certain financial reform benchmarks were met.  Previously, the Senate voted on May 3 (H.R. 4939; FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations) to cut $47 million in appropriated economic assistance to Egypt as an offset for additional spending on humanitarian emergencies in Africa and Guatemala.

Also interestingly the 2007 paper covers a crackdown on IRI and NDI:

Many in the Egyptian government appear to feel threatened by the current thrust of U.S. policy and resist some U.S.-advocated changes that seek to empower opposition movements. In June 2006, the  Egyptian government ordered the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), two U.S. democracy promotion organizations, to halt all activities in Egypt until they

formally registered with the government. According to the group’s officials, they have submitted papers for registration in early July and are waiting for an Egyptian government  response.  In the meantime, their offices are open, but all programmatic activity has come to a halt.  Egypt took this action after the government was reportedly angered by the comments of an IRI employee who gave an interview to a local paper in which she remarked that political reform in Egypt had not been achieved in the past 25 years and that the institute would work to speed up political reform in the country.

 

2011 Paper’s take on USAID views of Egypt’s generals
U.S. democracy assistance also faces competing pressures. On the one hand, some U.S. officials perceive a need for the United States to provide technical assistance to new political forces eager to compete in Egypt’s open political landscape. However, Egypt’s military leaders have vocally condemned long-standing U.S. democracy assistance programs and grants to Egyptian civil society organizations as unwanted meddling in Egyptian affairs. Some observers believe that the military has been deliberately attempting to discredit secular/liberal activists by portraying them as American agents for accepting U.S. technical assistance. Finally, now more than ever U.S. policymakers believe that U.S. military aid is needed to support continued Israeli-Egyptian peace given recent terrorist attacks inside Israel emanating from groups operating in the Sinai Peninsula.

Critics may suggest that the Egyptian military has no alternative to maintaining the peace treaty as it remains qualitatively outmatched by the Israel Defense Forces and Egypt’s fragile fiscal condition could not bear the international isolation that would likely accompany a return to a policy of confrontation with Israel.

Recent fears in 2011 – also, totally around government and not military:

“…would prohibit U.S. security aid to Egypt unless the President certifies that “the Government of Egypt is not directly or indirectly controlled by a foreign terrorist organization, its affiliates or supporters, the Government of Egypt is fully implementing the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, and the Government of Egypt is detecting and destroying the smuggling network and tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.” 

Sources

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124082.pdf
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33420.pdf
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155979.pdf

 All these reports are by Jeremy M. Sharp – excellent coverage of Egyptian-US relations (with emphasis on financial assistance packages and considerations)

 

So apparently – amongst the wide variety of consumer and military goods produced (literally almost anything you can imagine) - we manufacture/produce our own tear gas, of the CS variety!

This is from Section C of the Technical Annex in “Crowd Control Technologies : An Assessment Of Crowd Control Technology Options For The European Union” – which was published in May 2000.  So potentially could have stopped production but feel like that would have been counter to the regime’s mindset – obviously, they don’t have moral qualms against using it but potentially may have been discontinued due to other reasons (although hard to think of some given that profitability is not an important criteria and neither is actually selling it...)

Given that we manufacture this stuff, then at least use your domestic supplies and don’t make us go in debt to teargas ourselves!  I suppose it is similar to the dynamic of bread/basic foods in Egypt – the demand far outstrips domestic supply...

On a more serious note though, potentially there was some foresight that the US/EU would eventually cut/decrease shipments so domestic production has been stockpiled until they go through the new 21-tonne US resupply from November).

Anyway – document is below!

Factory 10 (the one producing the tear gas)  is located in Alexandria and its military products include small arms and ammunition; while civilian products include shotgun cartridges, semi-automatic bakery lines, food cans, aerosol containers, aluminum containers.  

Also apparently companies called “Egypt & Middle East Co” and “Perfect Security Systems” manufacture batons and water cannons, respectively.  I will bet both of these are owned by former army generals.  Unfortunately only name I could find for latter company is Eng. Mahmoud Kamal (too generic) and the first company name is too generic to quickly identify people.  Alternatively, name is “Perfect for Security Systems” (PO Box 136, Mohandeseen, Giza). 

And sure enough, a little more digging and clearly it is a military company – nobody else produces for the military sector (god forbid competitive bidding) and especially telecom equipment sensitivity.  They turned up on US government website, although they caveat it quite a bit http://export.gov/egypt/businessserviceproviders/index.asp?bsp_cat=80141700 (“The BSP directory is intended to provide an additional resource to U.S. exporters doing business in this geographic area. The BSP directory is not comprehensive. Inclusion does not constitute an endorsement or recommendation by the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service.”)

Perfect Security Systems
Contact: Eng. Mahmoud Kamal, General Manager
54 Syria St., Mohandessin, Giza, Egypt.
Phone: +20(2) 336-7270; +20(2) 338-5695; +20(2) 336-7271
Fax: +20(2) 336-7271
Email: mhkamal@soficom.com.eg7R#j5Z9r2H8G)[,_.m
Web: http://www.metrace.com/perfect (website not working)
"We specialize in importing if fire alarm, fighting and security safety systems, anti-intruder alarm, C.C.T.V, surveillance systems, electronic components and telecommunication for civilian and military sectors. "

Going through that website it seems at first glance that there are a substantial number of military related/linked companies (e.g. “Arab Engineering & Distribution Company (AEDCO) is a Joint Stock Company, organized and existing under the laws of the Arab Republic of Egypt,” “Caesar Service operates in the field of security and guarding services under scientific basis that have been well developed in order to suit the working conditions in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Caesar’s professional team, which consists of ex-military and police officers, has enabled the company to become a pioneer in this field.,” and another http://www.remage-egypt.com/about.html)

Still trying to pour through the crazy amount of information regarding Egypt military-industrial complex but it is really overwhelming – every company you discover brings about 4 more military companies and a new general manager to dig into!

Debating the merits of a sustained boycott of SCAF products/companies versus a general strike

I have begun pouring over army company information and compiling a page here (http://ow.ly/8WsUQ) and @AalamWassef provided this great overview (http://ow.ly/8ZiNM - download the PDF, great trove of information) documenting military owned companies and assets - all part of the massive interweb of people, companies, products and services that they use to finance their privileges, benefits, etc. (plan on trying to document those soon as well but these include all those properties on Salah Salem with fancy military gates inside - I have been inside a few of them and they are far nicer than you would expect...)
I believe the only thing that will make SCAF change planned course of action is fear of losing those benefits... So the question is what SCAF needs to maintain its privileges/benefits.  I think we can agree that it is generally easier to stay "rich" when you have the support of the West (i.e. despite being horrible dictators across their reign compared Saddam and Qaddafi's life pre/post US-isolation - circa pre1991 and pre1984/post2002, respectively for each...

Therefore, the end extremely worrying situation for #SCAF would be that the US/West flips on them the same way they did when Saddam invaded Kuwait and Qaddafi's Lockerbie, nuclear weapons, etc.!  In that regard, Israel is our Kuwait/Lockerbie/Nuclear Weapons... The most apt analogy is the nuclear weapon one since, just the ability to break out, is considered leverage.  By the same token, Egypt's ability to wage war (at most) or facilitate proliferation of extremism or turn a blind eye to their development in Sinai (at minimum) can be seen as its "nuclear weapon".

At this point, it turns into an exercise in game theory... When looking at the defense establishments of both countries, at the end of the day neither Egypt wants to go to war with Israel nor does the United States want to cut its military aid to Egypt - which both sides know.  The question that the US needs to answer is whether Egypt can go to war with Israel? (Which my complete, unsubstantiated guess would be no).  The next question is how far SCAF is willing to deteriorate the country to hold onto their own benefits?  Historically, leaders have been willing to undergo a spectrum of isolation but we can make some educated guesses.

The fundamental premise is that #SCAF might not mind seeing Egypt turn to shit as long as they retain some benefits (i.e. pretty sure Pakistani army officers live a pleasant life despite state of their country)!

The most extreme example that comes to mind is North Korea's Kim regime which has no problem starving the whole country and living as global pariahs as long as the core power base is satisfied in Pyong Yang.  However, that regime was bred out of isolation and has become accustomed to living locally luxurious but globally isolated.  The leaders of North Korea cannot go shopping in Paris or take family trips to New York - something I suspect our general have become quite accustomed to.  (According to the New York Times American handlers ensure that a day per visit is carved out for Sami Anan, his wife and three kids to go shopping in Tyson’s Corner with an affinity for electronics and jeans.  Additionally, his occasional drinking probably makes him weary of Saudi love)

However, beyond North Korea there are a variety of regimes from Pakistan to Mozambique to Cuba to Iran.  (Which, when looking at this list – and North Korea – there is a strong similarity: the regime has been in power for decades and has yet to show palpable signs of weakness – although take into account, by definition we are filtering out all the failed ones so the above list in and upon itself cannot lead one to conclude that the best path to regime longevity is authoritarianism at all costs.)

Now – in my mind – the only situation that SCAF would be OK with is a Pakistan type situation.  My knowledge on Pakistan is pretty limited but from what I do know there is a deep military/intelligence state (let’s not forget Head of Intelligence Omar Suleiman has been untouched during revolution and, by many unconfirmed accounts, continues to be part of the state security system with privileges and access).

As a result, I think that confrontation with the military is useful in letting them know we are not going away – however, in reality, they have the guns, tanks, planes, weapons, etc. and – with Maspero and Ahram printing press under their control – they likely will have a sizeable portion of public opinion in the short/medium turn.  Therefore, what we need to address is the specific privileges that they are fighting to protect.

While civil disobedience does have its merits, it is also akin to using a sword to perform a surgery – even if it does succeed in cutting off the correct limb; it will likely take a few with it.  The collateral damage will not be felt by most people on Facebook/Twitter but for the 40% living day to day it is not sustainable – they will feel the pain before the military does.  At that point, the HOPE would be that they realize the army is responsible for the dire circumstances and, in one swift swoop the public would realize the countless army transgressions and see the benefits of a truly civilian state!  Unfortunately, not too optimistic that is how it would play out (i.e. far more likely that they would leverage Maspero and Ahram printing press to ensure their message is heard).  In short,  I worry they will turn the civil disobedience to their advantage and use it to consolidate their support - i.e. an us against them discourse (with "them" being protesters who will be presented at destabilizing Egypt).  Moreover, plays very well into anyone who will say "Look at these well off protesters, they can go on strike and not feel the pain whereas #SCAF - and MB for that matter - understand your difficulties and work with us to help you solve them).
Further adding to my belief in the discord between protesters calling for civil disobedience and the general public comes from the polls that have been released over the past year (see an attempt to capture them here (http://ow.ly/8Zlju).  In Q4 2011 a poll released showed that " • 65% of the Egyptian either agrees or strongly agrees that protesters should be prevented from using the Tahrir Square."  In essence civil disobedience is a large, nationwide strike.  In addition, it explicitly demands things protestors and revolutionaries used to have to defend throughout protesting (i.e. protesters in tahrir are stopping traffic, 3agalit el entag, mayroo7a yishoofo li nafsohom shoghlana , etc.).  While one poll may be flawed, these tendencies came out consistenly in other polls as well.  Specifically on the civil disobedience, this stood out ": Only 1% of people participating in "workers strikes" while 25% of people participated in street protests " (25% seems high but its polls, self reported).  Another poll showed that only 34% of Egyptians feel strongly about the need for civil law.  Coupled with the fact that, when asked about reasons for protesting, Egyptians cited low Living Standard/Lack of Jobs" 64% of the time with lack of Democracy/reform coming in at 19% "

The army obviously doesn’t care about the welfare of the people, only raising a concern about that when there is the potential of the sha3b blaming them (i.e. the whole point of a pseudo-civilian government to take the blame – the lovely game of “fire the cabinet, hire the cabinet, repeat). ALthough some report it cares about its image, its fine as long as no threat of revolt.
Unfortunately, I do not see general strike / civil disobedience as fitting into those criteria.  The army will simply say “Look, there are foreign forces trying to destabilize and they are getting revenge because we attacked their American financiers.”  Today, SCAF’s official Facebook accused AUC students of causing discord (http://ow.ly/8Zf4e) and conspiring against the state.  Fortunately, most people who look at Facebook can search the internet for reports on reality – however, when Maspero is pushing this message there is little that can be done to counter it (although much respect for @3askarkazeboon and @mosireen for their persistent efforts to show the people the truth).  Also, let’s not forget Al-Ahram publishing reach – which, again given its importance, controls around 90% of press printing and 85% of distribution...

I think the only thing that will hurt is fear of losing economic privileges – which we cannot expect the US to willingly do.  Given their ownership of 40% of the economy through consumer facing brands, the focus should be on choking those companies!  That way, SCAF cannot say we are trying to destabilize Egypt – bil 3aks – these are companies that do not pay taxes, use Egyptian employees for free, etc. – we are simply supporting the average Egyptian’s claim on his money and due payment for his efforts.

Public campaign: anytime you see someone drinking Safi water explain how the military benefits from this and pays no taxes - they are literally stealing from you every time you purchase a bottle of Safi water!  (In addition to them using your brother's free labor to keep lining their pockets...

Think a sustained boycott of military products would be great - with more impact and less downside on average person than a general strike.  If it were targeted on Army companies and a long-term sustained campaign!  Not only when they cede to civilian power but as a principle - INDIVIDUALS in the military should not be profiting on our backs...

Also, it is a little more palpable for a nation of 85M to request them to use ALTERNATE products (e.g. buy Baraka instead of Safi) but, given day to day salaries of majority of population, staying at home is expensive!


The above is just thinking out loud - I am by no means particularly knowledgeable of civil disobedience or boycotts but I think history is a useful guide and civil rights in the US would be a successful example of the former and South Africa and/or Israeli boycott an example of the latter... 

Started looking into the military’s civilian production and sales to get an idea and, while I have yet to go through all the info, it is one large, complex web of interconnected companies and personalities.  All of the information is from public sources, websites, Google searches, etc.

Some key names and companies keep popping up in large investment projects and having lived in Egypt you can see the potential correlation between unnecessary public spending projects and the army’s economic interest.  While there is no direct link, it is interesting to see random video monitors pop up in the middle of Cairo (e.g. Gama’eat Al Dawal Street intersection with Gezirat Al Arab) and you see that the military produces THESE.  Additionally, the traffic signal digital display countdown timers that have been installed in many main streets (e.g. Battal Ahmed Abdel Aziz after exiting off 6th October bridge) and a military company produces THESE. Also, it is interesting to see that they produce billboards then advertise their OWN PRODUCTS (guessing that has something to do with the parliamentary budget oversight issues).

To give you an idea of the range – the army produces anything from CRATES to HOTEL DINING/RECEPTION to LAVISH HOTEL ROOMS (to the more simple ones) to COMPUTERS to TVS to DVD PLAYERS to INCUBATORS to DATA CENTERS to YACHTS!! (CLICK on item names to see actual pictures of military products in each category)

While I have been able to come across names of companies and types of goods produced and some specific consumer-facing product names (see list below for some of the identified, more commonly known ones).  It has been far more difficult to come across any financials (especially recent ones).  One of the companies had $36M and employed 1,517 (apparently sometime around 1998?).  Another company (Jeep and other light vehcle production) employs over 17,000 people (unclear of date).  One of the larger holding companies made $100M in the 1980s apparently.

While I am still pouring over the information, there are some initial interesting tidbits:

An engine factory writes:

• Delivery of drinking water & sewage drainage projects worth LE365M+ (around $60M) 
• With another LE964M+ (little over $160M) in the process of being delivered
  

Around 1999 three of these companies were placed under sanctions by the US due to the transfer of dual use technologies provided by the US to North Korea

A factory focused on electrionics states:

• Produced of over 50k TV sets
• Produced of over 50k computers

One factory that focuses on equipment for the railway claims to have produced:

• 2,369 rail coaches/cars 
• 16,200 freight transport cars
• 36,591 bogies
• 225 subway cars
• 250 “trommay” cars
  

Another factory that is focused on aircraft (?!?!?) claims :

• Delivery of drinking water & sewage drainage projects worth LE566M+ (little less than $100M) 
• With another LE602M (little over $100M) in the process of being delivered
  

Below are a list of some of the companies (compiled from various sources thanks to great work, will cite but just so many and don't have time right now, apologize - but includes jadaliiya, @arabist, Ahram, Robert Springboard writing, various Google books, etc.) - also, may be some repeats:

• 'Wataniyya'
  
• 'Queen', the military's cleaning services company
  
• high-tech slaughterhouses in East Uwaynat 
  
• cabins to rent out in the north coast Sidi Crir resort last summer; 
  
• apartments for sale in Kuliyyat al-Banat residential buildings
  
• Safi spring-water company, aviation services, security services, travel services, footwear production, and kitchen-appliance manufacturing.
• television sets, jeeps, washing machines, wooden furniture and olive oil, as well as bottled water under a brand reportedly named after a general’s daughter, Safi
• Queen,’ the army-produced brand of pasta

From random companies/factories:

• Civilian products are the same, in addition to precision casting. casting of hematite iron, grey iron, and steel.  
• Civilian products include shotgun cartridges, semi-automatic bakery lines, food cans, aerosol containers, aluminum containers
• Civilian products include dynamite, industrial nitro-cellulose, sodium toluene sulphonate, potassium chlorate, shotgun powder, hydrogenated oils, blasting services
• Civilian products include electric motors, electric fans, electric switches and sockets
  
• Civilian products include water meters; electric meters; fastners; bolts & nuts and incinerators.
• Civilian products include radiators, sewing machines, medical and surgical instruments, general cutting tools, oil coolers, agricultural machines, shotguns, air rifles, meat mincers, scissors, kitchen knives, and wooden furniture
• Civilian products include irrigation sprinklers, aluminum foils, brass, copper and aluminum brass, sections, strips, plates, tubes, blocks, castings, sheets, wires and cables, water combinations, aluminum tea pots, copper tables, insulated electric wires, copper and aluminum cables, and conductors
• Civilian products include formaldehyde and hexamine paints, safety and detonating fuses, rubber and plastic products, and adhesives
• Civilian products include fire extinguishers, gasoline pumps, automatic balances, pressure cookers, stainless steel cooking pots, gas bottlers, gas regulators, cutlery, pistons, piston rings, cylinders
• Civilian products include paints, inks, varnish, beauty products, potassium chlorate, and anesthetic ether
  
• Civilian products include television receivers, radios, TV antennas, and personal computers
• Civilian products include electric meters, water meters, ball bearings, bolts and nuts, degreasing solutions, phosphating solutions, and axle boxes
• Civilian products include gas rings, gas ovens, solar water heaters, refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners
• Civilian products include diesel engines, generating sets, welding sets, pumping sets, bearing shells, compressed air sets, and tractor engines
• Civilian products include lathes, drilling machines, grinders, wood sawing machines, shapers, milling machines, automatic and semi-automatic bakery lines, agricultural machinery and equipment
• Engaged in the production of passenger cars, Jeep Wranglers, and 4x4 Jeep Cherokees. This Egyptian and American joint venture was formed in 1977, and company employs over 17,000 workers producing military jeeps and other light vehicles
• Engaged in the production of intermediate chemicals; incecticides and fertilizers; house insect insecticides; industrial gases; cosmetics and other aerosol products
• Civilian production includes microscopes
• El-Nasr Company for Services and Maintenance (Queen Service) - security; maintenance works for electrical and water networks; purging works; automobile service stations; and vocational training
• Armed Pharmaceutical Factory - Equipped with West German machine tools (Johann Weiss), this factory makes such pharmaceutical products as tincture of iodine and bandage
• Cutleries : sets of cutleries of extra ordinary beauty and attractive styles ( normal and gold coated ) , made of stainless steel.
• kitchen sets : Pressure cookers, Cooking pots , Frying pans , Casseroles, tea & sweet Sets , Plates and trays  ( normal and decorated) , made of stainless steel.
  
  
• Fire extinguishers 99 :  With dry chemical powder , foam and carbon dioxide ( in different types and sizes form 1 kg to 250 kg ).
  

• Fire detection and alarm systems , Automatic Fire extinguishing Systems and light fire fighting vehicles.
• LPG cylinders 30 lt. And 60 lt. , cylinder valves and gas regulators
• Automotive feeding industries:
• Internal combustion engines parts ( Pistons,  piston  pins, rings and cylinder liners 
• Automotive shock absorbers.
• Automotive steel wheels.
• Special manufacturing tools workshop for producing gauges, dies (drawing cutting , forming , pressing , forging and carting tools ), jigs and fixtures for Metal and Bakelite.

Please see http://ow.ly/91X86 for updated list of SCAF members...

While this may seem like a moot point, I think the lack of transparency is ridiculous (not even full list of names) around the 20-odd person body that is controlling 85M people with almost complete authority and no (other than guns) legitimate mandate to rule through today...

So was General Etman promoted or fired? http://ow.ly/8P7UQ (promoted to deputy chief of army staff ) vs http://ow.ly/8P7W0 (fired but retains advisory role)...  Where does this leave him with regard to SCAF membership? According to latter source "while no longer a member of the 20-member military council, Etman will remain one of Tantawi’s many advisers, positions given to officers closely tied to the army leadership, the source at the Defense Ministry said."

Also, does his replacement (Major General Ahmed Abul Dahab, director of artillery division) now join SCAF? 

My previous count was at 21 but we may be down to 20 now (which corroborates Masry Al Youm article).

Also, found the only video I know that has a large number of SCAF members visible.  However, which corroborates SIS website per the previous SCAF Member Confusion Post

If he was fired because of the image of the army in the media (per Al Masry al Youm) my advice would be to try changing behavior instead of rotating faces... 

Update

Al-Masry Al Youm has multiple articles claiming he has been effectively fired but have not seen additional confirmation...

http://ow.ly/8P8Bw: Reasons given were Maspero, appointment of Samir Farag and lack of response to Tantawi speeches by Egyptians

Great article at http://ow.ly/8F4RA, with some extracted points below:

• The simple answer to what brought Egypt’s economy to its knees: a mismanaged and slow transition.
  
• The long-winded version: Unwillingness on the part of the ruling powers to meet peoples’ demands in a manner that does not disrupt national economic affairs for prolonged periods of time. Coupled with haphazard decisions, unclear policies and a series of crisis management failures on the political and economic fronts, while creating a state of fear and chaos, this has caused uncertainty among investors and set off a domino effect of negative economic repercussions, all made worse by an extended and murky transition to civilian rule.
• It’s convenient to blame the mass protests for that, but logistically speaking, it was the measures taken by Mubarak’s regime that made it impossible for many sectors to function.
  
• The telecom cut, internet blackout and stifling curfews meant to put pro-democracy activists in the dark disrupted the regular work flow by handicapping communication, shortening operational hours and hampering the transportation of goods.
  
  
• The overall economy, beyond the volatile realm of speculation on listed stocks and the value of the currency, was more or less crippled by the government itself.
• government’s closure of banks and the stock market proved detrimental to capital flow.
• showed how the government’s confused hesitation and indecisiveness can cause unnecessary panic and uncertainty
• owever, they promptly closed days later after protests by workers in the public sector banks. Why all banks, public and private, around the country had to shut down for a whole week remains a mystery, but the move prompted more wariness about access to liquidity. Local businesses had trouble paying employees’ salaries.
• For almost two months the stock market remained closed despite frantic resounding calls by local and foreign investors, analysts and asset managers to open for trading and deal with the inevitable nosedive. What’s worse was the lack of clarity about the reasons behind the decision.
• “The greatest obstacle for investors at the start of 2011 was the restriction of capital flow, initially because of the closure of the banks, but chiefly in the unjustifiably long period during which the stock market was closed,” Roelof Horne, Africa fund manager at UK-based Investec Asset Management, told Daily News Egypt.
• “As long term investors…we took a view from the start that a peaceful uprising in Egypt calling for democracy and accountability was a reason to be more excited about the country, not to capitulate,” he said.
• The night Mubarak stepped down, Beltone Financial’s Angus Blair told DNE, “The army [council] has to realize that there has to be good microeconomic governance of Egypt.”
• Throughout the year, much of the reserves went to propping up the pound instead of letting it gradually devalue to its real rate.
• “Foreign reserves have dropped because they’ve burned through the reserves to prop up the currency. But if they stop doing that, then the value of the Egyptian pound nosedives and basic food prices will rise, that’s very sensitive politically,” Sabra said.
• Beltone Financial reported in the last quarter of 2011 that foreign investors began dumping Egyptian debt as a result of increasing concern over the country’s widening deficit, also citing a messy political transition.
• Selim, however, said that compared to costs incurred by Eastern European economies during their political transformation, “the pressure on the exchange rate and the depletion of reserves, as well as pressure on external and public finances — such costs in the short-term were not too drastic.”
• The result? Stagnant and murky economic policies that left investors, both local and foreign, scratching their heads.
• “The current interim government seems confined by its ‘care-taker’ status. Foreign tourists still don’t know if the country is safe. Investors fear reprisal actions against companies that could lead to shareholder losses.”
• This counters the propagated idea that protests are bad for the economy and slow down the mythical “wheel of production.”
• “It’s convenient for the military, using powerful tools such as state media, to portray protests as slowing down the economy…even if there is no real connection between the two,” said Eurasia Group’s Sabra.
• Expectedly, tourism numbers dropped drastically in early 2011, looked like they may recover by mid-year, but then faltered again after violent crackdowns on protests in October (Maspero), November (Mohamed Mahmoud) and December (Cabinet).
• While Cairo tourists are scarce, the Red Sea resorts performed better throughout the year.
• All the while, investors, both domestic and foreign, have repeatedly said that all they were looking for in 2011 was a clear timetable for the transition to an elected civilian power — they are still waiting.
  
• Similarly, Sabra said that the “biggest obstacle [to foreign investors] is lack of clarity about politics — investors by and large prize predictability above everything.”
• “It’s not for nothing that you’re now seeing the IMF engage more, because the military now has cover — there’s a parliament and transitional government so they can start to withdraw to the power behind the scenes and have the people up front taking those decisions,” he added.
• But lack of transparency around this issue is only fueling concerns.
• If confidence in the state to provide the most basic and most socially sensitive goods falters, analysts believe Egypt will see unrest of a different kind this coming year.
• The fundamentals of Egypt as an investment destination remain unchanged: a massive consumer market of mostly youth, skilled labor with a lot of unrealized potential, a strategic geographic location — as well as control of the vital trade route through the Suez Canal — and ample touristic treasures.

In Egypt, governing authority shifted from the Mubarak regime to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a group of military leaders who have dispensed justice through military tribunals, engaged in periodic crackdowns on critical media, raided the offices of civil society organizations, mistreated women activists, and engaged in violence against Christians. While a protracted election process, still under way at year’s end, was conducted with an adherence to fair practices that stood in vivid contrast to the sham polls of the Mubarak regime, the dominant forces in the new parliament will be Islamist parties whose devotion to democracy is open to question. 

As 2011 drew to a close, officials in Egypt made headlines by conducting a series of raids on NGOs that monitor human rights and promote democracy. Most of the targeted organizations were Egyptian; a few were international groups (Freedom House was one of the latter). The authorities were insistent that the raids, which included the seizure of files and computers, were legal and technical in nature. Government officials emphasized and reemphasized that they believed human rights organizations had a role to play in a democratic Egypt. Their actions indicated otherwise.
In fact, the behavior of the Egyptian authorities, now and under Mubarak, reflects a deep-seated hostility to NGOs that support democracy and human rights. This in turn points to a broader institutional continuity between the current Egyptian state and the old regime that will present major obstacles to democratic development in the coming months and years, and similar dynamics may play out in other countries where authoritarian rule is being defied.

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2012 

The way I see it: If somebody robs my house, steals my identity, applies for loans in my name supposedly to fix the house and then uses it to buy himself drugs and nice shoes - then don't think it should be my responsibility to ensure all those people that granted him loans are paid back - ESPECIALLY when they knew that the money was not being spent in the best interest of the "homeowner" (i.e. citizen)

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ammous2/English

 A glance at Egypt’s public finances reveals a disturbing fact: the interest that the country pays on its foreign loans is larger than its budget for education, healthcare, and housing combined. Indeed, these debt-service costs alone account for 22% of the Egyptian government’s total expenditures.

This debt was incurred during the 30-year reign of the deposed president, Hosni Mubarak. In international law, debt that is incurred without the consent of the people, and that is not used to their benefit, is referred to as “odious”; as such, it is not considered transferable to successor regimes. The reasoning is simple and logical: if someone fraudulently borrows money in my name, I am not expected to pay it back, and neither should a country’s population when an unrepresentative leader borrows in their name and to their detriment.

The beneficiaries of this largesse are now mostly sitting in prison awaiting trial. The rest of Egypt, however, only felt this money in the form of an ever-expanding state apparatus that solidified Mubarak’s rule, crushed dissent, and repressed millions. When Egyptians rose up against Mubarak in January, they were confronted by weapons paid for with borrowed money.

Is it fair to expect Egyptians to continue paying for their previous repression and impoverishment at the hands of Mubarak and his cronies? Since this money clearly benefited Mubarak but not his people, should it not be Mubarak, rather than his victims, who is held responsible for it?

The type of regime Mubarak was running had been clear for many years, and it was also clear how the money was being used. A prudent lender should have considered these facts before making the loans. So the banks and international institutions that lent money to Mubarak should bear the responsibility of their choice to bankroll his repressive regime.

An Egyptian precedent would bring awareness and sobriety to an entire generation of lenders that is not accustomed to considering this type of risk, and that may even be unfamiliar with the doctrine of odious debt. Repressive regimes would find it harder to borrow, which would, in turn, make it harder for them to repress their people, and make it easier and cheaper for responsible and legitimate governments to secure important funding when they need it.

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20074_en.pdf

It is well established in international law that a political transition, even from an oppressive regime to a popularly legitimized one, does not in itself break the continuity of state-to-state debt obligations, even where the transition involves state succession. At the same time, state practice, the rulings of international tribunals and the writings of most academic authorities reflect acceptance of some equitable limits to the sanctity of state-to-state debt agreements. The international law obligation to repay debt has never been accepted as absolute, and has frequently been limited or qualified by a range of equitable considerations, some of which may be regrouped under the concept of “odiousness”. This is consistent with the accepted view that equity constitutes part of the content of “the general principles of law of civilized nations,” one of the fundamental sources of international law stipulated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 

The concept of “odious debt” regroups a particular set of equitable considerations that have often been raised to adjust or sever debt obligations in the context of political transitions. A survey of such transitional situations in the past or present indicates that the way in which the “odiousness” is argued as a ground for limiting obligations, which varies from one transitional context to another, and may differ depending on whether the transition involved, is for instance a secession, whether it arises from war or decolonization or simply a political revolution. 

In a number of the situations in question, tribunals or other States have rejected or questioned claims to adjust or sever debt obligations based on considerations of “odiousness.” However, this has usually been because of doubts on the facts as to whether the debt in question was “odious” or actually conferred some benefits on the population or the new regime. In none of these situations was a claim of odious debt rejected on grounds that international law simply does not countenance alteration in state-to-state debt obligations based on any equitable considerations whatever. In some situations, the debtor State made overly broad claims to repudiation of debt obligations (the case of attempted Soviet repudiation of Tsarist debts and more recently the Islamic Republic of Iran’s attempted repudiation of pre-revolutionary debts before the Iran Claims Tribunal). 

Political transitions pose complex, multi-faceted challenges for the transitional regime, from accountability for wrongs of the past, to establishing a framework of legal stability and economic reconstruction. Dealing with odious debt from the prior regime usually involves political as well as legal considerations. Even where a strong legal argument exists for repudiation of some or all debt based on considerations of odiousness, a transitional regime may well prefer to negotiate a voluntary adjustment in obligations with its creditors or even to continue to repay the debt. South Africa is a case in point. Such decisions do not detract from the availability of considerations of odiousness as a legal basis for alteration of debt obligations, but rather simply testify that transitional justice is political, and not just legal.

Examples:

• Annexation of the Republic of Texas 
  
• Apartheid Debt
  
• Iraqi debt 
  
• Norway’s ship export debt 
  
• The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
  
• United States refusal to assume Cuban debt – 1898 Paris Conference 
  
• Soviet repudiation of Tsarist debts 
  
• Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and Polish debts 
  
• Tinoco arbitration – 1923 (Great Britain and Costa Rica 1923) 
  
• German repudiation of Austrian debts – 1938 
  
• 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy 
  
• Arbitrations concerning Iranian debts owed to the United States