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Egyptian Protesters: A one shot deal? A historical analysis of expectations & disillusionment

4/13/2012

24 Comments

 
"...to expect the events of early 2011 to serve as a guarantee of good governance in the post-Mubarak era might be naïve. Indeed, to the extent that any post-Mubarak government fails to live up the expectations of the Egyptian citizenry, it might counter-intuitively make those citizens less likely to protest in the future."
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Meirowitz (Prof. of Politics, Princeton) & Tucker (Assoc. Prof. of Politics, NYU) look at the role of the individual & past experiences in determining whether citizens will decide to participate in protests. (i.e. why are citizens willing to bear the cost of protesting once to remove a go, only to shrug their collective shoulders at that same scenario coming to place later?) - http://ow.ly/agziQ

"However, a third conclusion from the model is a bit less obvious. Namely, we find that the one-shot deal scenario may be more likely when citizens have less certainty about the nature of the universe of potential governments. To put this more intuitively, in an established democracy, we might expect that citizens generally believe the quality of the government will be “good.” (By “good” we don’t necessarily mean that the government is above average for the governments in that country, but only that it meets some basic threshold such as competently executing government policy, not being corrupt, not stealing from the population, etc. Governments that fail to meet this threshold could be considered “bad.”) Thus in an established democracy, when by misfortune citizens happen to get the odd “bad” government, it is worth a potentially costly effort (i.e., an extended protest) to replace that government, because you are confident your replacement will probably be good.

In a new regime, however, citizens may have much less confidence about the universe of potential governments, i.e., whether in general most governments are good or most governments are bad. Consider the case of Ukraine in 2005 following the Orange Revolution. Citizens have observed a number of bad governments. This may be because (a) non-democratic governments are bad or (b) most Ukrainian politicians are corrupt. At the time of the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians may have been motivated to protest because they believed (a) to be the case, and thus switching to a more democratic system would usher in a period where governments would be generally good. However, if 2005-2010 reveals nothing more than a series of bad, democratically elected, governments in Ukraine, then Ukrainian citizens may come to believe that they are simply living in a world where all Ukrainian governments are bad. And if that’s the case, why bother protesting again?


Which brings us back to Egypt. If political developments proceed as expected, then at some point in the near future Egypt will have democratic elections. My post today should be taken as a warning that to expect the events of early 2011 to serve as a guarantee of good governance in the post-Mubarak era might be naïve. Indeed, to the extent that any post-Mubarak government fails to live up the expectations of the Egyptian citizenry, it might counter-intuitively make those citizens less likely to protest in the future. Thus the stakes for Egypt’s initial post-Mubarak governments may be even higher than we already expect."

I think this can also be expanded to describe our failure at enacting a variety of changes, not just changes in government...

Unless one fundamentally believes that people in this region (or the developing world as a whole) are inherently inferior to those in the currently democratic, developed nations then the full UNIVERSE OF POTENTIAL GOVERNMENTS"/SOLUTIONS EXISTS exists for us as well– and there is no fundamental reason we should not have access to that whole universe! I'm sick of hearing people’s ideas put down because “the West doesn’t even have that”… I don’t recall the men of the renaissance only aspiring to achieving parity with the Ottomans or Chinese, or the US founding fathers limiting themselves to what the UK had…

Fundamentally, it also comes down to stop giving ourselves excuses… when we are abroad and the streets are clean, people stand in lines, etc we think “Tab why can’t we do this?” and a myriad of problems arise: lack of education, people are lazy, etc. etc… The answer needs to be “WE CAN DO THIS” and the thinking should be on how to enact that, instead of wasting mental energy as to why it CANT be done… 

Yeah, it won’t happen overnight but having the belief that we actually can reach there is the first step… It sounds cheesy but I do believe we live with this strange complex about our ability vis-à-vis that of Western nations/people..

Much of the summary provided by this excellent piece on the Wall Street Journal by one of the authors http://ow.ly/agzsf

24 Comments

Egypt: Learning from the Turkish Model

3/11/2012

4 Comments

 
Over the past several years Turkey has emerged as the darling of the Arab world with its direct confrontation of Israel killing its civilians and it’s tough stance on Syria.  The government of Turkey attempted to broker an agreement between IAEA and Tehran regarding its nuclear program and stood up for Palestinian rights with Erdogan confronting Peres about the Gaza massacre during the World Economic Forum.  Most importantly, unlike false bravado we have seen in the rest of the Arab region, this is reinforced by strong economic growth (not just at macro level GDP figures but with wealth increasing across most levels of society), domestic stability and increased political openness.  I believe this is the result of increasing civilian control of government and, through understanding how Turkey got to this point, we can learn from their experience and avoid their mistakes.

Kamel Ataturk formed the modern Turkish republic following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and, although he was a military officer himself, he actively endeavored to limit the military’s role in politics – most explicitly by a decree in 1930 that prohibited active officers from holding political positions.  After the coups d'état in 1960, the National Unity Committee established the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces in 1961 to legitimize military interventions in politics – thus placing it in a similar position to what Egypt was in post-1952.  However, the countries have diverged over the past decade.  Much like Mubarak’s Egypt, Turkey tended to blindly support Western programs and concede to Western requests and while Egypt was under the tutelage of the US, Turkey’s drive was a mad desire – particularly on the part of the military – to join the EU.  While I will not go into why this shift occurred per se, two key factors are the hurt dignity of the Turkish people being repeatedly rebuffed by the EU and the relatively weak economic growth both resulting from lack of accountability at top levels. In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Erdogan took nearly 2/3rds of parliament seats and over the past decade has cemented its control on government and wrestled power away from the generals.  A few telling harbingers are that the new defense minister and deputy defense minister are former AKP party members, Turkish withdrawal of its ambassador from and severing of military ties with Israel and, most spectacularly, the arrest of over 40 generals who were allegedly plotting a coup to remove Erdogan from power.  Moreover, the AKP’s rise has been accomplished not through force, backroom deals, cronyism but rather through full transparency and enabling the populace to trust, and have faith in, their government.

The beneficial results of ceding power from the military are numerous.  Most importantly, the people in control are now fully accountable to their populace – previously the military (through constitutional dictate that they imposed after some of the four coups in the past 30 years) was allowed to intervene in Turkish politics to preserve the secular nature of government – specifically stating that "the Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey”.   In reality what this meant was the military was able to consistently secure its own privileges – threatening any civilian government who attempted to advance the country in face of military interests with immediate removal manifested most recently in 1997 with the removal of elected prime minister Necmettin Erbakan (they executed Turkey’s first democratically elected prime minister, Adnan Menderes, in 1960).  While the reasons why this is not a sustainable system are numerous, I believe the key point is the lack of accountability.

Accountability is defined as having to face consequences as a result of your actions – without this it is hard to correct the path one is on and ensure consistent re-guidance.  Rather, the absence of accountability (i.e. no elections) enables one to perpetuate incorrect action – moreover, when this lack of accountability is extended to criticism too (i.e. media restrictions) then not only are leaders not self correcting but they tend to be unaware of their failures.  Unfortunately, politics globally has taught us that political parties tend to desire perpetuation of their control/rule and – barring some reworking of human nature – we cannot change that.  However, what we can change is the incentive structure.  The merits of democracies are that, in order to perpetuate power, a party has to deliver results to its citizens or else next election cycle the opponents will capitalize on that failure and potentially win office.  In the systems  setup in Egypt, there was little correlation between delivering results to citizens and staying in power.  The NDP just had to ensure that its party members would remain loyal and that they did not step on the toes of the military; as long as they kept both those groups happy there was little fear of them being shaken. In fact some political observers argue that, in reality, it was Gamal Mubarak’s encroachment on the military's economic benefits that was the crucial factor in the Mubarak’s and NDP’s downfall.

One may argue that the Turkish model served the country well for many decades and set the stage for the current transition they are undergoing today – however, there are three key differences in Egypt’s case.

First of all, practically speaking, the Egyptian military has many differences with the Turkish that would make the lead-up to transition much rougher.  From the onset, the Turkish military showed a progressive outlook for the underlying vision of their nation. The Egyptian military, while not evil, lacks that driving force and - as a result - is more so driven by selfish motivations to maintain their hold on power/finances. In essence, the army is willing to give power to civilians only as long as the army is assured its economic interests; as such, the initial discord with the NDP arose - not due to underlying allegiance to citizen/nation - but rather because of Gamal's aggressive economic agenda (e.g. privatization of banks) that wrested some of the military's economic control.  In reality, the officers seem only interested in stability, maintaining their economic interests, and preserving the legitimacy of the armed forces despite having been the backbone of a thoroughly discredited regime for 60 years. As a result, the SCAF seems to be willing to hand over power to anyone who can guarantee those three interests.

Second, philosophically speaking, there is no reason to believe that Turkey could not have achieved this same result several decades ago had the people stood up to the military and on the side of civilian government – despite potential disagreements with some details of various political groups, the people (Egyptian or Turkish) need to support the independence of a civilian government.  Moreover, given SCAF’s conditions for civilian control, allowing them to perpetuate control and limit civilian government to their liking would be disastrous and lead us to a Mubarak 2.0 (not forgetting that they supported v1.0 for decades).

Finally, most commentators believe it is EU demands on Turkey that led to the gradual transition to civilian power – a constraint that the Egyptian military does not face.  Turkey’s democratic changes, which remain far from complete, happened despite the military, not because of it.  This is most evident in the effect EU demands have had on the MGK (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, considered the institutionalization of the Turkish military’s influence over politics) a body that can be considered very similar to today’s SCAF.  Based on the Copenhagen criteria – requirements for Turkey to enter EU negotiations – the Turkish parliament passed a number of reforms, most recently in 2003 with the “seventh reform package” which most importantly made it possible to appoint a civilian head to the MKG, limited their control of media (radio and TV) and disbanded its Public Relations Command which covertly influenced public opinion by issuing public statements on political developments and government actions.

Let us realize the benefits Turkey is enjoying and, through understanding the reasons why, be more driven to demanding accountability of our government.  In most democratic nations military budgets are in the public domain, national security issues are subject to parliamentary oversight, and, they key difference: the military executes, rather than makes, national security policy – therefore, having foreign policy under the purview of the public.  


After 8 Turks were killed by Israeli Defense Forces during the Gaza flotilla incident, the embassy in Ankara was not stormed.  While there were "dozens" of stone throwing individuals - there was not wholesale craze as we witnessed on 9/9/2011 because the Turkish people knew their government would stand up for their citizens blood - in Egypt citizens felt they needed to make sure Israel heard Egyptian complaints since they had no faith that the SCAF would do so.
 
4 Comments

Gene Sharp, Iran and Foreign Agendas

2/29/2012

3 Comments

 

Gene Sharp Q&A (CIA, Soros, etc.)

Iranian Propoganda

When governments in the Middle East (and around the world) say that protesters are operating under foreign agendas and protesting for money, etc - it always strikes me as odd the transparency that these regimes offer vs what is offered by those that they throw allegations at. 

Anyway - regarding the baseless allegations.. Compare the two clips above and the questions/quotes that arise:

Iranian Propaganda Video (youtube link)
Two questions that arise for me are: 
  1. How come this type of conspiracy theory does not apply to the Arab government supporters? (i.e. intellectuals, propaganda, TV, radio, etc.) 
  2. Is there not one Western intellectual who may disagree and not play along? 
  3. Is there not one Arab intellectual/journalists who cares about his country enough to not facilitate its colonization?
  4. What does it say about the Arab youth and general citizenry if they are willing to conspire with any foreign element to cause disorder and neo-colonization? 

The last question is something that I have struggled with.  Even if the government does not believe the allegations of being a foreign agent, it disturbs me that many of my fellow compatriots readily believe this allegation when thrown at any of our youth.  However, it becomes more obvious why they think this if one assesses the word 'citizen'.  It is defined as an individual belonging to society with associated rights and responsibilities.  Given that historically we have had little/no rights then, by definition, there is little expectation for fulfilling any societal responsibilities (streets clean, no corruption, etc.) - the most extreme of this is being a traitor, when one is driven to forgo his/her own people for financial gain.  The most frustrating thing for me though is how Jewish Israelis can travel to Sinai, Egypt, anywhere they are allowed and the Israeli government does not automatically assume they are spies and interrogate them, given them a hard time, etc. - however, if any Egyptian were to visit Israel (or even Palestine proper) I think we all know the suspicions that would arise from fellow the government and, consequently, fellow citizens. 

At the end of the day, the Egyptian government during Jan25 protests was trying to peddle the message that the people in Tahrir squared are betraying their country for a KFC meal... The real question arises though: If one is willing to betray their country for some fried chicken, then what society do we really have??

Gene Sharp Interview (full video link here)

While you should watch the whole interview in the link above (it is around 1 hr 20min, but if you have a video program put it at 1.2 speed, it's still comprehensible and saves some time).  Anyway, the above clip I selected simply in response to the above allegations by the Iranian regime (and various other governments when they speak out against protesters).  Gene Sharp clearly advocates "RELY ON YOURSELVES ALONE  - DON'T DEPEND ON SOMEONE ELSE COMING TO SAVE YOU, THEY MAY NEVER GET THERE AND THEY MAY COME WITH SHACKLES AS WELL"   

Moreover, he speaks out against the CIA, foreign government's interests, etc. While one can claim this is all talk, he has also written books to that regard (i.e. the Anti-Coup which can be applied to the CIA-puppet governments in the 1960s-1990s in Latin America).  Finally, to top it all off, he even has writing on civilian based defense and how to prevent war, etc.  (i.e. he is agianst the military-industrial complex which I believe is what all of the corpiracy thoritests understand is driving the NWO, Masonic Groups, FreeMasons, etc.)  Maybe it is all a facade and his life work was all a cover up and his real motives are in support of the CIA and that military-industrial complex. Maybe.

First of all, it strikes me as funny how the people they accuse (e.g. Gene Sharp and George Soros) are frequently on TV and in conferences discussing their works, messages, etc. (just saw George Soros interviewed on Fareed Zakaria a few weeks back see HERE).  

Some quotes/ideas I liked from the discussion with Mr. Sharp:
  • It's a great advantage to know what you don't know - because it is an opportunity to learn, if you want to & if you are not arrogant"
  • The key was in studying the sources of power, what is power, what is the nature of revolutions and dictatorships..
  • 25:00 "Because you are non-violent, don't assume your opponent will be also.  There are people who naively assume that - its pure romanticism" Gene Sharp 
  • 25:19 "Dictators do not like the people to learn that they have power potential" 
  • 26:00 People sometimes justify violence: because we are getting killed, we might as well do something. Just know that is a suicidal step you are taking, because your enemy always has greater power for violent than you do.  So don't be stupid, don't do the thing he wants you to do, because he knows he can crush you if you go over to violence. That's why the political police put agents into the resistance groups " Gene Sharp
  • They [regimes] always have the military option, non-violence just makes it harder for them to use it
  • Lord Stephen King Hall (1957-1959): general in the British military who advocated nonviolent resistance to defend against invaders and occupiers (i.e. can be a national policy that protects a country)
  • There are sources of power - these sources are uncertain! you can regulate the degree to which the regime gets those sources of power - if you can shrink the availability of those sources of power by restricting the obedience and cooperation of the people and of institutions - then the power of that regime, however dictatorial, will be limited and potentially cut off.  (40:38?)
  • Something so simple as distributing a banned book - that is part of gnawing away at the foundations of that illegitimate regime - in this case, namely the lies and propaganda. Very simply - terrifyingly simple to the regime.
  • Question: Why do you think it was successful? 
    Gene Sharp: We didn't expect that - I thought that the end of the Burmese edition thats it.  These other things just started happenings and we dont know exactly how they happened (he had previously been discussing some of the individual activists who translated and transported the writings).  I think its been successful because people have been quietly desperate, they have been hungry... Is there something that can be done so we do not suffer these terrible plights that people before us for several decades have been suffering?  That we don't have to go through another war with all that distribution that ends up killing more people than it could be supposedly saving.  It was the hunger for that.
  • We were surprised - people were writing to us, I don't know how many people, sayiung the same thing: "we thought this was written for us."  And from totally different countries, religious groups, societies - the piece is now in four indiginous African languages.  
  • Non-violence scares regimes, it is harder to attack a non-violent movement's legitimacy because when people are sacrificing their lives not only for a better life but for higher principles - it is hard to doubt their faith.
  • You need to illustrate the solidarity of the people - that scares them, and you need to think through how to do this effectively.
  • "Internal issues with the power dynamics are very important and can really mess up a movement - there will be groups looking to take over the group for their own political purpose.  There are other who have the unanimity policy and - to me - that is nonsense and is disruptive to the, for example, occupy movements in the US in my opinion - although I am not an authority on those movements.  That is a knowledge that needs to be studied/developed and would be very useful."
  • 1:00:30 Discusses the negative of Western government involvement in the coups and his distrust of the CIA....
  • 1:03:00 discussion of corporate America, fake democracies, worry of revolutionary regimes being authoritarian as well, solutions to internal discord.
  • "Individuals cannot get rid of dictators.  just being good or committed is not enough, you have to work with other people - you have to get rid of the sources of power.  The source of power are not made available by individuals, they are by group s and by institutions."
  • You do not get rid of regimes/war by confronting - you need to undermine it.  More importantly, you need to have an alternative that is credible.  You get rid of regimes by not needing them anymore."  (Chapters of that in his book Sources of Power and Political Freedom)
  • On mix of violence and non-violence (i.e. different groups in Syria): "It is what the oppressor wants, because the violence will spread - it is confident and equpiied and prepared to use the regimes violence which is much gfreater than anything the rebel can produce." 
  • 1:13:00 Libya-related: Interesting hypothesis about Yunan Luis as an agent provaceteur put by Gaddagi to push for violent rebel opposition being supported by NATO.  Outcome is that: 1. there is intense violence there today when compared with Egypt and Tunisia 2. It took longer than it did in Egypt and Tunisia 3. Brought in foreign forces which delegitimized the opposition 4. he ws killed  mysteriously two weeks later 6. Two weeks propr to his flipping gaddafi and son predicted civil war (its flimsy but an interesting take - i.e. he hypothesizes that non-violence would have had better long-term outcome for Libya)
I am planning to meet with Mr. Gene Sharp in a few weeks to discuss options that non-violent protesters have during this transition period to ensure sustained pressure on authoritarian forces (i.e. SCAF) while not alienating larger society (i.e. most polls show that citizens desire martial law to deal with criminals and that they view protests unfavorably).  I would greatly appreciate any additional questions that 

Just as an unnecessary addition relating to the first video, I thoroughly dislike MEMRI and hate using their clip here given their appalling ability to nitpick on the smallest detail of negative Arab media yet I do not think (and pls correct me if I am wrong) I have ever seen anything shown of negative Israeli propoganda - whose effects can be seen HERE.
3 Comments

Vague Interior Ministry Reform

2/19/2012

2 Comments

 

In theory a good start but, of course, little/no details provided by government it seems... Any more info on the below? 

Given even very recent abuse (see here) and the potential of our police to be used as a tool of the regime in power, this is a key priority... (Some brief notes and links on the Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim can be found here)

From State Information Service: (official government)   http://ow.ly/9apvb
Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim asserted on Saturday 18/2/2012 that the ministry has taken the initiative to restructure its departments in a way that fits the nature of the current conditions in Egypt after the revolution.

The Police have their honorable patriotic history in Egypt and used to upright conduct and punctuality in both behavior and appearance, the Minister affirmed, adding that the police have the objective standards that are able to correct any mistake and abolish any negative aspect in the post-revolution phase and bring any individual involved in any act of negligence.

The Police have changed their security philosophy, slogan and work approach and are maintaining the stability and security of Egypt.

From Masry al Youm: http://ow.ly/9apsT

Freedom and Justice, the mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, leads with the headline, “Interior Ministry purged.” Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim has declared that various committees are being formed to restructure the ministry, adding that officers and soldiers have donated one day’s salary as a contribution to Egypt’s economy and a symbol of their love to their country. The article does not specify where these donations will go.

MP Farid Ismail, head of Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee and a Freedom and Justice Party member, agreed to the restructuring decision, according to the party paper. Ismail recently declared that a committee had been formed to question 805 Interior Ministry staff members who are allegedly implicated in crimes.

In the paper, Ismail also denied a “rumor” published by Al-Masry Al-Youm that FJP asked for an entire class of police graduates to be selected from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, saying Al-Masry Al-Youm’s article was a continuation of the newspaper’s policy of tarnishing the Brotherhood’s reputation.   

2 Comments

Testimony Describes Continuing Police Abuse and Impunity

2/17/2012

4 Comments

 
Came across this article a few days ago.  It is an account of musician Mohammed Jamal's (Salalem band) unjustified arrest and (by definition) unjustified abuse at the hands of state security.  Some tidbits are extracted below but the full article is available here.  

I hope that he continues to pursue the officers who are to blame because, until they feel they are held accountable for their actions, they will continue with these disgusting practices and continue to serve the next person in power with little regards to the people they should actually be serving - the people who pay their salaries - the citizens.
  • We were heading home one night after our concert at the Cairo Jazz Club, where we had performed with the Canadian singer NEeMA, when we approached an ordinary police checkpoint. The police signalled for us to pull over and politely asked to see my driving licence and our identification cards – which we handed over, also politely. They then asked to search the car and search us and, out of politeness, we let them. After they were done and had not found anything illegal or suspicious on us, they allowed us to continue on our way, and we did.Add Sticky Note | Remove
  • Shortly after I drove off, I realised that I hadn’t taken back my ID card from the police officer who had searched us. Just to be certain, we searched the car first for the card, and when we couldn’t find it, we decided to return to retrieve it.
  • Back at the checkpoint, we tried to find the policemen who had searched the car (it was busy and there were a lot of cars being checked over). When I found the officer in question, he insisted that he had given it back to me and then asked me to park because I was blocking the traffic and that he would come and search the car with me for it. Meanwhile, Walkman had wandered off to ask other if they have seen my ID. As I was searching the car with the officer, Walkman innocently asked another policeman about my ID, which he somehow took personally as an accusation of theft and proceeded, with a gang of other coppersm to kick and punch Walkman. When I came to Walkman’s aid, the police turned mercilessly on me too.
  • After a long session of beatings, we were dragged to a waiting police car. They confiscated my car and our phones. On the way to the police station, a police officer handed me my ID and told me, “Here you go, your card”. When we reached the station, we were already in complete shock and awe from what had just happened to us – something we had never experienced before. They walked us to a room in which there was a miserable, low-ranking officer from the remnants of the former regime. No one touched us in the police station but they were very generous with the swearing and insults.
  • We were also accompanied by a large number of serious criminals, many of whom seemed to be friends with the cops and they all had a laugh together.
  • The officer then approached us and said, “Fuck the revolution that made you think you could mistreat police officers. Why the fuck am I being drained on the streets all day. Isn’t it for you? What a fucking revolution.” He then sent his colleague off to write a police report to “screw us” with. The other officer then opened a drawer and got out a big knife, a bar of hashish, and some paper and left.
  • We later learnt that they hqd fabricated a police report accusing us of possessing two grams of hashish, a big knife, and attacking a police officer while on duty.
  • We were eventually taken to a middle-ranking police officer who was very respectful. He apologised to us when he heard the story and knew we were respectable people but he all he managed to do was to order the guard to keep us apart from the serious criminals until we were transferred in the morning to the prosecutor’s office.
  • Handcuffed, we were taken to the prosecutor’s office in a police van full of criminals
  • A decent lawyer came to our aid and the prosecutor was also very respectful. He tried to explain that what had happened was because we looked “weird” and that our attitude as musicians might have provoked the officer. Unfortunately, that’s the mindset many in the police force have. We were released on LE400 bail and now Walkman and I are charged with three quite serious crimes.
4 Comments

Odious Debt - Holding Egypt Back

1/16/2012

3 Comments

 
The way I see it: If somebody robs my house, steals my identity, applies for loans in my name supposedly to fix the house and then uses it to buy himself drugs and nice shoes - then don't think it should be my responsibility to ensure all those people that granted him loans are paid back - ESPECIALLY when they knew that the money was not being spent in the best interest of the "homeowner" (i.e. citizen)

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ammous2/English

 A glance at Egypt’s public finances reveals a disturbing fact: the interest that the country pays on its foreign loans is larger than its budget for education, healthcare, and housing combined. Indeed, these debt-service costs alone account for 22% of the Egyptian government’s total expenditures.

This debt was incurred during the 30-year reign of the deposed president, Hosni Mubarak. In international law, debt that is incurred without the consent of the people, and that is not used to their benefit, is referred to as “odious”; as such, it is not considered transferable to successor regimes. The reasoning is simple and logical: if someone fraudulently borrows money in my name, I am not expected to pay it back, and neither should a country’s population when an unrepresentative leader borrows in their name and to their detriment.

The beneficiaries of this largesse are now mostly sitting in prison awaiting trial. The rest of Egypt, however, only felt this money in the form of an ever-expanding state apparatus that solidified Mubarak’s rule, crushed dissent, and repressed millions. When Egyptians rose up against Mubarak in January, they were confronted by weapons paid for with borrowed money.

Is it fair to expect Egyptians to continue paying for their previous repression and impoverishment at the hands of Mubarak and his cronies? Since this money clearly benefited Mubarak but not his people, should it not be Mubarak, rather than his victims, who is held responsible for it?

The type of regime Mubarak was running had been clear for many years, and it was also clear how the money was being used. A prudent lender should have considered these facts before making the loans. So the banks and international institutions that lent money to Mubarak should bear the responsibility of their choice to bankroll his repressive regime.

An Egyptian precedent would bring awareness and sobriety to an entire generation of lenders that is not accustomed to considering this type of risk, and that may even be unfamiliar with the doctrine of odious debt. Repressive regimes would find it harder to borrow, which would, in turn, make it harder for them to repress their people, and make it easier and cheaper for responsible and legitimate governments to secure important funding when they need it.

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20074_en.pdf

It is well established in international law that a political transition, even from an oppressive regime to a popularly legitimized one, does not in itself break the continuity of state-to-state debt obligations, even where the transition involves state succession. At the same time, state practice, the rulings of international tribunals and the writings of most academic authorities reflect acceptance of some equitable limits to the sanctity of state-to-state debt agreements. The international law obligation to repay debt has never been accepted as absolute, and has frequently been limited or qualified by a range of equitable considerations, some of which may be regrouped under the concept of “odiousness”. This is consistent with the accepted view that equity constitutes part of the content of “the general principles of law of civilized nations,” one of the fundamental sources of international law stipulated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 

The concept of “odious debt” regroups a particular set of equitable considerations that have often been raised to adjust or sever debt obligations in the context of political transitions. A survey of such transitional situations in the past or present indicates that the way in which the “odiousness” is argued as a ground for limiting obligations, which varies from one transitional context to another, and may differ depending on whether the transition involved, is for instance a secession, whether it arises from war or decolonization or simply a political revolution. 

In a number of the situations in question, tribunals or other States have rejected or questioned claims to adjust or sever debt obligations based on considerations of “odiousness.” However, this has usually been because of doubts on the facts as to whether the debt in question was “odious” or actually conferred some benefits on the population or the new regime. In none of these situations was a claim of odious debt rejected on grounds that international law simply does not countenance alteration in state-to-state debt obligations based on any equitable considerations whatever. In some situations, the debtor State made overly broad claims to repudiation of debt obligations (the case of attempted Soviet repudiation of Tsarist debts and more recently the Islamic Republic of Iran’s attempted repudiation of pre-revolutionary debts before the Iran Claims Tribunal). 

Political transitions pose complex, multi-faceted challenges for the transitional regime, from accountability for wrongs of the past, to establishing a framework of legal stability and economic reconstruction. Dealing with odious debt from the prior regime usually involves political as well as legal considerations. Even where a strong legal argument exists for repudiation of some or all debt based on considerations of odiousness, a transitional regime may well prefer to negotiate a voluntary adjustment in obligations with its creditors or even to continue to repay the debt. South Africa is a case in point. Such decisions do not detract from the availability of considerations of odiousness as a legal basis for alteration of debt obligations, but rather simply testify that transitional justice is political, and not just legal.

Examples:
  • Annexation of the Republic of Texas 
  • Apartheid Debt
  • Iraqi debt 
  • Norway’s ship export debt 
  • The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
  • United States refusal to assume Cuban debt – 1898 Paris Conference 
  • Soviet repudiation of Tsarist debts 
  • Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and Polish debts 
  • Tinoco arbitration – 1923 (Great Britain and Costa Rica 1923) 
  • German repudiation of Austrian debts – 1938 
  • 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy 
  • Arbitrations concerning Iranian debts owed to the United States

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Either a government is lying or a newspaper is misreporting...

1/11/2012

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From the Guardian article: http://goo.gl/dh4XT

“Boutros-Ghali has been living openly in London despite being convicted of corruption and profiteering in Egypt. An Interpol "red notice", which seeks information about a suspect, was issued after he fled the country but he cannot be arrested by police in the UK until Egypt issues an international arrest warrant.”

From Egyptian Independent paper:  http://goo.gl/xYREq

The Egyptian Embassy in London has renewed its official request for the extradition of former Finance Minister Youssef Botrous Ghali on five occasions, said Foreign Ministry spokesman Amr Roshdy on Wednesday.

He explained that in April 2011, Egypt's judicial authorities submitted a request demanding Ghali's arrest through the London embassy. The request, according to Roshdy, was renewed in May, coinciding with the Egyptian embassy's efforts to detect the runaway minister's movement.

Roshdy said the Foreign Ministry made a similar request in July 2011 after Ghali was sentenced in absentia to 30 years in prison on corruption charges. Roshdy said that the Egyptian Embassy had also notified the UK Home Office of three international arrest warrants issued against the former minister.

Egypt and the UK do not have an extradition agreement.
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Advisory Council

12/14/2011

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The proposed 30-member advisory council includes...

1.      Mansour Hassan: former information minister (president of council)

2.      Mohamed Nour Farahat: Social Democratic Party leader (elected secretary general)

3.      Sherif Mohammed Zahran: unknown occupation (assistant to secretary general)

4.      Abdul Mohammed al-Moghazy: unknown occupation (assistant to secretary general)

5.      Abul-Ela Madi: leader of Al-Wasat Party  (deputy to the president)

6.      Ahmed Kamal Abul-Magd: vice chairman of the National Council of Human Rights

7.      el-Sayed el-Badawi: leader of Al-Wafd Party

8.      Hassan Nafaa: political science professor at Cairo University

9.      Sameh Ashour: president of the Bar Association (deputy to president)

10.    Abdel-Aziz Hegazy: a former prime minister

11.    Ashraf Abdel-Ghafour: head of the actors' syndicate

12.    Amr Moussa: a presidential candidate

13.    Mohamed Salmawi: a writer

14.    Mohamed Selim el-Awwa: a presidential aspirant

15.    Moataz Bellah Abdel-Fattah: a political sciences professor

16.    Naguib Sawiras: Businessman, Leader of Free Egyptians Party




General info:
The advisory council on Sunday (12-11-2011) elected Mansour Hassan, as its president. 

OLD LONG INTERVIEW WITH MANSOUR HASSAN I had watched a while back but videos seem to have disappeared: http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com/2007/12/mansour-hassan-interview-with-mona.html)  Accoring to Zeinobia, he "was replaced in the Mubarak era "he already resigned after the September 1981 arrests"

The members elected two deputies for Hassan: Abul Ela Mady, president of the Wasat Party, and Sameh Ashour, president of the Lawyers Syndicate.

Mohamed Nour Farahat, a leader from the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, was elected secretary general. Sherif Mohammed Zahran and Abdul Mohammed al-Moghazy were elected assistants to the secretary general.

Ashour told Egypt’s al-Masry al-Youm daily that they were elected in a secret ballot.

The council’s secretary general will act as liaison between the council and the SCAF. The council is to convene at least once a week, but may meet whenever the need arises or upon the request of one-third of its members or the head of the SCAF.

Twenty-four of the council’s 30 members were present at the first meeting. Among the most notable absentees were Coptic businessman and founder of the Free Egyptians Party Naguib Sawiris, presidential hopeful Amr Moussa, and president of al-Wafd Party al-Sayed al-Badawy.
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El-Ganzouri's New Government (updating notes as they come in)

12/7/2011

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Overview:
Egypt’s new interim National Salvation government, headed by Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri, was sworn in by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi on Dec. 7, state-run Channel 1 TV reported. The ruling military issued a decree that granted el-Ganzouri presidential powers while allowing the military to retain control of military affairs and the judiciary, Al Jazeera reported, citing MENA. After el-Ganzouri was sworn in, Tantawi attended a closed meeting with the National Salvation government, Elyoum Elsabaa reported. Among the new officials chosen, Maj. Gen. Mohamed Ibrahim (former head of the interior ministry's security directorate in Giza province) was appointed interior minister, Al-Masry Al-Youm reported.

Egypt's new cabinet members: (any info/sources on any of these??)
- Prime Minister: Kamal el-Ganzouri (new) (http://ecesr.com/?p=4929)
- Foreign Affairs: Mohamed Kamel Amr
- Interior: Mohamed Ibrahim Yusef (new)
- Justice: Adel Abdel Hamid Abdullah (new)- Education: Gamal el-Arabi (new)
- Tourism: Mounir Fakhri Abdel Nur
- Finance: Mumtaz el-Said (new)
- Electricity: Hassan Younnes
- Supplies and Domestic Trade: Goda Abdel Khaleq
- State Minister for Domestic Trade and Development: Mohamed Attiya Ibrahim
- Religious Endowments (Waqf): Mohamed Abdel Fadil el-Qawsi
- State Minister for Military Production: Ali Sabri
- Information: Ahmed Anis (new)
- Housing: Mohamed Fathi el-Baradei- Civil Aviation: Hussein Massoud (new)
- Social Security and Social Affairs: Nagwa Khalil (new)
- Communications and Technology: Mohamed Abdel Qadir Salem (new)
- Petroleum: Mohamed Abdullah Ghorab
- Planning and International Cooperation: Fayza Abul Naga
- Production and Foreign Trade: Mohamed Eissa
- Irrigation and Water Resources: Hisham Qandil
- Agriculture: Mohamed Rida Ismail (new)
- Transport: Galal Moustafa El-Said (new)
- Health and Population: Fuad el-Nawawi (new)
- Immigration: Fathi Fekri (new)
- Culture: Shukri Abdel Hamid Suleiman (new)
- State Minister for Scientific Research: Nadia Zukhari (new)
- Higher Education: Hussein Moustafa Moussa (new)
- Antiquities: Mohamed Ibrahim Ali (new)
- Environment: Moustafa Hussein Kamel (new)

Gov. members source: http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/index.php?action=news&id=22637&title=Egypt's%20new%20cabinet

Notes on members:
  • The fact that several leading public figures under consideration for ministerial portfolios have declined the posts does not bode well for the Ganzouri government’s legitimacy. Prominent journalists Adel Hammouda and Magdy al-Gallad both declined the Information Ministry post, while actor Mohamed Sobhy rejected an offer to lead the Ministry of Culture.  [EgyptSource, English, 12/1/2011] [al-Ahram, English, 12/2/2011] [al-Masry al-Youm, Arabic, 12/2/2011]

  • Great overview of Interior Minister (Mohammed Ibrahim) - Thank you @hany2m (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/539041)

    بعد 13 يوماً من التعثر فى حكومة الجنزورى، واستمرار التعتيم «لأسباب أمنية» حول من يخلف اللواء منصور عيسوى، وقع اختيار رئيس الوزراء المكلف، على اللواء محمد إبراهيم يوسف، مساعد أول حبيب العادلى، وزير الداخلية الأسبق حتى 23 نوفمبر 200

  • Overview of Interior Minister: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/146117.aspx

    وقد بدأ محمد إبراهيم يوسف حياته المهنية بعد تخرجة بدفعة 73 في مباحث الجيزة وتدرج في المناصب حتي وصل إلي منصب مدير مباحث الجيزة ثم نقل بعد ذلك إلي مصلحة الأمن العام برتبة "لواء " و عين مديرا لأمن الجيزة " حيث أشرف علي إنتخابات 2010 بالمحافظة. 

  • @Ssirgany Sarah El Sirgany RT @Nadiaglory: #militarysource just confirmed to me : new information minister Ahmed Anis is a retired army general #scaf #media

  • وصاحب «مجزرة اللاجئين» لـ«الداخلية» (http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/530361)

    وكان اللواء المرشح لتولي وزارة الداخلية، مدير أمن الجيزة في عهد حبيب العادلي، وأحد أبرز الذين تعرضوا لانتقادات شديدة، بعد مهاجمة اللاجئين السودانيين، أمام مفوضية الأمم المتحدة بالمهندسين، مما تسبب في عشرات الجرحى، والمعتقلين، حيث اعتبر حقوقيون ونشطاء العنف «غير المسبوق» تجاه اللاجئين «مجزرة»، وطالبوا بمحاسبة المتورطين فيها، إلا أن الوزارة وقتها لم تقدم أي متهم للعدالة.

  • Interior minister response to some of the allegations http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/539466


  • Agriculture employees react to appointment of new minister: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/28710/Egypt/Politics-/Agriculture-ministry-employees-reject-new-minister.aspx

    A group of agriculture ministry employees have issued calls for an open strike on Wednesday to protest the nomination of Saad Nasar for minister of agriculture and land reclamation... Nassar is a former governor of Fayoum and a former chairman of the state-run Agricultural Research Centre.Ministry employees complain that Nasar had been a close associate of former agriculture minister Youssef Wali, who also served at one point as secretary-general of the now-defunct National Democratic Party of ousted president Hosni Mubarak. A controversial figure, Wali currently stands accused of importing carcinogenic fertilisers and pesticides from Israel in a case that is still being prosecuted in Egyptian courts.ar is a former governor of Fayoum and a former chairman of the state-run Agricultural Research Centre.Ministry employees complain that Nasar had been a close associate of former agriculture minister Youssef Wali, who also served at one point as secretary-general of the now-defunct National Democratic Party of ousted president Hosni Mubarak. A controversial figure, Wali currently stands accused of importing carcinogenic fertilisers and pesticides from Israel in a case that is still being prosecuted in Egyptian courts.

  • Ganzoury's 'salvation government' sworn in amid skepticism (http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/egypt/ganzourys-salvation-government-sworn-in-amid-skepticism-dp2.html, 12/7/2011)

    The choice of General Mohamed Ibrahim, former head of the Giza Security Directorate, as the new interior minister heightened the agitation of activists towards the new Cabinet.

    “As activists, we know his history and the vicious way he dealt with demonstrators,” said Ingy Hamdy, spokesperson of the April 6 Youth Movement, adding that they do not acknowledge El-Ganzoury nor his new Cabinet.

    She said Ibrahim was responsible for the notorious violent raid on the Sudanese refugees’ sit-in in Mostafa Mahmoud Square in December 2005, which left at least 28 dead.


  • Additional Info on Interior Minister http://news.egypt.com/english/permalink/70008.html

    For the Interior Ministry, he proposed Mohamed Ibrahim Youssef, the former Giza governorate security director until 2000, after which he served as assistant minister for economic security for six months before former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly refused to renew his term in 2001.

  • Reaction of Protesters to Cabinet: http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/egypt/ganzourys-cabinet-nomination-fails-to-satisfy-critics.html  (pre-announcement, 12/4/2011)

    "We are preparing a list of youth figures that can hold this position instead of those old names, the majority of whom were aides of Habib El-Adly (former interior minister)," said Ahmed Meshaly, member of the General Coalition of Police Officers.

    He stressed that the coalition refused Major-General Abdel Rehim Qenawy, nominated by El-Ganzoury, claiming that he oversaw the rigging of the 2010 parliamentary elections as one of El-Adly's aides.

    Meshaly, however, refuted claims that Major-General Mohamed Ibrahim, also nominated by El-Ganzoury, is being tried for killing demonstrators during the Jan. 25 revolution as has been reported recently.

    "This one is the former security chief of Giza district. The other one on trial at the criminal court is the security chief of Alexandria," Meshaly said.
  • Account of Sudanese Incident: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/31/international/africa/31egypt.html?pagewanted=all
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