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SCAF Member Confusion: Was Etman promoted or fired? Still on SCAF? Does his replacement join?

2/1/2012

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Please see http://ow.ly/91X86 for updated list of SCAF members...

While this may seem like a moot point, I think the lack of transparency is ridiculous (not even full list of names) around the 20-odd person body that is controlling 85M people with almost complete authority and no (other than guns) legitimate mandate to rule through today...


So was General Etman promoted or fired? http://ow.ly/8P7UQ (promoted to deputy chief of army staff ) vs http://ow.ly/8P7W0 (fired but retains advisory role)...  Where does this leave him with regard to SCAF membership? According to latter source "while no longer a member of the 20-member military council, Etman will remain one of Tantawi’s many advisers, positions given to officers closely tied to the army leadership, the source at the Defense Ministry said."

Also, does his replacement (Major General Ahmed Abul Dahab, director of artillery division) now join SCAF? 

My previous count was at 21 but we may be down to 20 now (which corroborates Masry Al Youm article).

Also, found the only video I know that has a large number of SCAF members visible.  However, which corroborates SIS website per the previous SCAF Member Confusion Post

If he was fired because of the image of the army in the media (per Al Masry al Youm) my advice would be to try changing behavior instead of rotating faces... 

Update

Al-Masry Al Youm has multiple articles claiming he has been effectively fired but have not seen additional confirmation...

http://ow.ly/8P8Bw: Reasons given were Maspero, appointment of Samir Farag and lack of response to Tantawi speeches by Egyptians






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SCAF Member Confusion (Post 2)

1/16/2012

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PLEASE SEE HERE FOR LATEST VERSION - THIS IS OUTDATED! (http://www.ducoht.org/1/post/2012/04/scafs-musical-chairs-the-current-22-plus-2-former-members.html)   

Up to 21 at this point based on what I have come across...


Youtube website video: (can't seem to find that video where they are all around the half-circle table - think that's the only time I have seen them all present!  There were tons of them on youtube but can't seem to find any of them recently..!)

1. SIS Website from 2/18/2011: (total of 14)

Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi, former Minister of Defence and Military Production
Lt. General Sami Annan, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Admiral Mohab Memish, the Commander of the Maritime Force
Air Marshal Reda Hafez, the Commander of the Air Force
Lt. General Abdel Aziz Seif, the Commander of the Air Defense Forces
General Hassan al-Rwini, the Commander of the Military Central Zone
Staff General Ismail Othman, the Director of the Morale Affairs Department
General Mohsen al-Fanagry, the Assistant Defense Minister
Staff General Mohammed Abdel Nabi, the Commander of the Border Guard
Staff General Mohammed Hegazy, the Commander of the Third Field Army 
Staff General Sobhy Sedky, the Commander of the Second Field Army 
The commanders of the northern, southern and western zones (3 additional)

[Birth Years: Tantawi (1935), Annan (1948), Hafez (1952), Seifeddin (1949)]

2. Amnesty International Report  (http://goo.gl/e1qvO)
Adds...
  • Major-General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Head of Military Intelligence 
  • Mohammed Said al-Assar, Assistant Defence Minster

For a total of 16...
3. Youm7 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201112050301.html)

Adds
  • Maj. Gen. Mamdouh Abdul Haq, a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) said in a meeting at "90 minutes TV program" on 3/12/2011
For a total of 17...

4. Foreign Affairs magazine, September/October 2011, "Commanding Democracy in Egypt"
  • In May, General Mamdouh Shahin, a member of the SCAF (legal affairs)
For a total of 18...

5. Wikipedia (says they are 18)
A total of 18 members including Six other military commanders (possibly including the four chiefs of staff of the four branches of the Egyptian Armed Forces).
Adds: 
  • Major General Mohamed Saber Attia - Chief of Operations for the Armed Forces
For a total of 19...


Has names for the regional military zone commanders:
  • Major General Hassan Mohammed Ahmed - Commander of the Northern Military Zone
  • Major General Mohsen El-Shazly - Commander of the Southern Military Zone
  • Major General Mahmoud Ibrahim Hegazy - Commander of the Western Military Zone
  • Six other military commanders (possibly including the four chiefs of staff of the four branches of the Egyptian Armed Forces).
Flips SIS designations/titles saying that: 
  • "Major General Mohamed Hegazy â€“ Commander of the Second Field Army; Major General Sedky Sobhy â€“ Commander of the Third Field Army"

From 12/19 Press Conference about Parliament Building
"But only advisors apparently"
  • "Adel Emara"
  • "Kato" (hitler oven dude - old video of him:  http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/332949)

From Carnegie Endowment (Jan 5th, 2012): http://ow.ly/8vqJm

"A list of the nineteen members of the SCAF is provided below, with the first eight being the most outspoken:"

Adds:

  1. Major General Mukhtar al-Mulla: Assistant defense minister
  2. Major General Adel Amara: Assistant defense minister (he was only highlighted as an advisor before but Carnegie puts him as a proper member)
  3. Also had different names for the commanders of regional armies (Western, Northern and Eastern)

For a total of 21! 
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SCAF Commanding Democracy in the Middle East (Foreign Policy article great overview of mentality, strategy, concerns, etc.)

1/10/2012

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Read this in August/September but really a great, comprehensive overview 
Full article available here or here

Goals
1.  Hopes to create a system that’ll preserve its power by reducing chances any single political group rises & is using its mythic status & public fear of instability. (Also using single-member seats, farmers/workers provision, governor placement and using the media.)

2.  Don’t fear Iranian-style coup as much as MB growing into a political force like the AKP in Turkey which can gradually wrest power from the army. 

TACTICS
Even more dangerous, perhaps, is the new electoral law put in place by the SCAF that maintains a system of single-member districts for half the seats in the lower house of Egypt's parliament with the other half to be chosen based on a party-list system (I think this has been changed to 75% list based since publication). Although it may seem like a minor technicality, this law is harmful to Egyptian democracy. For one, it will aid local power brokers. These officials typically ran as independents under the prior regime, only to join the NDP after the election to secure patronage for their districts. A system of single-member districts will cement this kind of pattern by reducing campaigns to competitions over which candidate can best win resources for his region. The military prefers this to proportional representation, which would foster party identification by allowing voters to choose between parties campaigning on national platforms. It would also introduce Egyptians to new political forces that might challenge the SCAF's authority, particularly in less developed areas of the country where local power brokers still rule.

The military is also working to secure its influence over parliament by maintaining a provision that reserves half the seats in the lower house of parliament for what the electoral law calls "farmers" and "workers." First adopted by former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser as a means of empowering the masses, the provision eventually came to be used by retired military officers and internal security personnel as a way to enter government, by qualifying as farmers or workers. Indeed, Amr Moussa, a presidential candidate who has served as Egypt's foreign minister and as secretary-general of the Arab League, has conceded that "in reality 90 percent of the ‘farmers'" are former military officers. On taking office, these legislators typically joined the parliament's Defense and National Security Committee, the only body in the Egyptian government that even nominally supervises the military, further diluting what little civilian oversight there was.

Since the revolution, the generals have sought to maintain control over key instruments of power, especially provincial governorships, to complement their top-down control. Governors are appointed by the regime and oversee all local development projects, making them central players when it comes to distributing patronage. In the Mubarak era, roughly three-quarters of the governors came from the military or the internal security and intelligence services. After the revolution, many expected the SCAF to increase the number of civilian governors. Yet just the opposite has occurred. In April, the transitional government actually increased the number of posts held by former military or security officers. In the face of popular criticism, the military is now considering allowing governors to be directly elected, but it has yet to make a final decision. (Has this been decided? Haven't heard anything.)The military has also found willing allies among parts of the media, which have questioned whether the "shaky hands" of civilian leaders can impose law and order in such unstable times. Although some of these security concerns are legitimate, this coverage has conditioned the public to believe that handing power to civilian leaders risks destabilizing the country.

OVERVIEW
Above all, the generals are determined to preserve stability and protect their privileged position.   They recognize that ruling the country directly threatens their position by potentially provoking instability, exposing them to public criticism, and dividing their ranks. And they want to avoid being blamed for Egypt's growing economic and social problems, such as double-digit inflation and unemployment, continued labor unrest, and a rise in crime. As a result, the SCAF is eager to hand power over to an elected government — but only to preserve its power and perks, not out of some deep-seated belief in democracy.The generals, then, seem to be seeking not a genuinely open and representative political system for Egypt but rather one that will allow them to retain the final say over the country's foreign policy and avoid civilian oversight. The elected government, in their vision, would carry the burden of day-to-day rule — and bear the brunt of any public displeasure.Although the military did not to seek to overthrow Mubarak, this year's demonstrations gave it an opportunity to restore its central position. Since ousting Mubarak and ascending to power, the SCAF has deftly channeled lingering public outrage over corruption toward those who have threatened its own power, such as Mubarak's business cronies and members of his formerly ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).The generals now hope to create a system of carefully shaped democratic institutions that will preserve their power and reduce the chances that any single political group can challenge them. The SCAF's decision to legalize banned political parties and allow the formation of new ones can, to some extent, be understood in this light. Although the move did represent a concession to popular demands, it also diffused political power — something that clearly benefits the military.The generals understand, of course, that they cannot operate as if the revolution never happened, and they realize that they risk further unrest if they fail to meet some of the protesters' demands. Thus, the SCAF has instituted presidential terms limits, strengthened judicial oversight of elections, and created a more transparent process for the registration of political parties. It has also promised not to run one of its own in the country's presidential race and to maintain the long-standing policy whereby military and internal security personnel — up to 1.5 million people — abstain from voting. Yet the military ultimately wants an Egyptian government that does not threaten its position. It is attempting to build a system more democratic than Mubarak's but still beholden to its interests, betting that in a desire for stability, many Egyptians will accept this compromise.The SCAF has carefully directed the course of Egypt's transition by empowering political forces that do not oppose its dominance or are too vulnerable to try. It has courted two main partners: the established opposition parties, such as the Wafd Party, which have criticized the military on certain policies but have demonstrated loyalty by not questioning its right to rule, and, more important, the Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, who share the SCAF's desire to limit the growth of liberal forces (albeit for different reasons) and have considerable power to mobilize the street.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
The Brotherhood helped build public support for the March referendum that mandated elections this fall and has reliably backed the SCAF in the months since. For example, when critics accused the military police of using live ammunition on April 8 to clear Tahrir Square of protesters pressing for a civilian-led transition, and the SCAF claimed that the bullets had come from counterrevolutionary snipers intent on driving a wedge between the people and the army, the Muslim Brotherhood's leader, Mohammed Badie, endorsed this conspiracy theory and condemned all attempts to "bring about division or subversion between the people and its army."Even when it did join protests against the generals in early July, the Brotherhood agreed to participate only after youth groups dropped their public demand for a faster transition to civilian control and agreed to focus instead on speedier trials for former officials and security personnel accused of killing protesters during the revolution. And when youth demonstrators chanted for the removal of Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, leader of the SCAF, the Brotherhood called on the protesters to "appreciate the role of the military in protecting the revolution rather than criticizing it."The SCAF views the Muslim Brotherhood as an attractive partner not because of any ideological affinity but because the party is both publicly popular and legally vulnerable.  The Brotherhood's leaders understand that to cement its place in Egyptian politics, they must convince the military that they pose no threat to the basic order, which makes them keen to demonstrate their loyalty.

US INFLUENCE
Washington's most obvious leverage is the $1.3 billion in aid that the United States provides the Egyptian military each year, estimated to cover up to 80 percent of its procurement costs.  Even if the United States were to vigorously campaign for democracy, it would still have limited power to shape events on the ground given the weakness of liberal democratic parties in the country, the reverence for the military in Egyptian society, and popular distrust of U.S. intentions. Even the $1.3 billion in security assistance buys little clout, since the generals view it as a reward for maintaining peace with Israel, an attitude that the United States can do little to change.Since 1973, by carefully cultivating and protecting its own mythology, the Egyptian military has maintained unparalleled popularity, with public approval ratings hovering around 90 percent.But this steady diet of praise has made the generals hypersensitive to criticism. For example, when over 1,000 people died in a ferryboat accident in the Red Sea in 2006, critics accused the military of failing to deploy quickly enough to rescue them. Rather than submit itself to public examination, however, the military reportedly tampered with the parliamentary investigation that followed and made sure that it did not receive any of the blame. In the postrevolutionary era, the SCAF has demonstrated the same aversion to public criticism.The United States must also prevent the SCAF from hiding behind its relationship with Washington. For example, when General Shahin insisted that the military receive special protections under the new constitution, he justified his position by arguing that the U.S. military is given the same privileges under U.S. law — an obvious falsehood. The Obama administration should have publicly disputed Shahin's disingenuous comparison by noting that in the United States, unlike Egypt under current SCAF rule, military budgets are in the public domain, national security issues are subject to congressional oversight, and, most important, the military executes, rather than makes, national security policy.The military is gambling that its mythic status in Egypt and public fears of instability will allow it to create a political system to its liking.  
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Al Mosheer Tantawi Wikileaks Description

1/7/2012

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For an updated version (more graphical, better organized, etc.) please see here

All from wikileaks cables, excerpts from larger pieces but other parts were mainly about Gaza, Iran, etc which are also very interesting but figured it would be too much and distract from domestic issues - reading through those though, his stances on foreign policy issues are worth reading (e.g. Feb, 2008: You must try to convince Israel to stop cutting off humanitarian supplies to the Palestinians, Tantawi said. "Not all Gazans are Hamas." The trouble is that when Israel tightens the siege around Gaza, "thousands of innocent men, women, and children suffer." AND Sept, 2006:Tantawi then asked for U.S. help in getting Israel to"calm down" and stop hindering the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the Palestinian people.) - can provide links if desired.

Written by US diplomats so take it for what its worth - while not the most telling of information, unfortunately, the lack of transparency makes it hard to find more "legitimate" information from other places... 


While this is about Tantawi, will try to create a similar one about other SCAF members who are cited/discussed..

Back to Al Mosheer:

February 2010:

Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Defense Minister Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore one of our chief impediments to transforming our security relationship. Nevertheless, he retains President Mubarak's support. You should encourage Tantawi to place greater emphasis on countering asymmetric threats rather than focusing almost exclusively on conventional force. 

December 2009:

Tantawi added that any country where the military became engaged in "internal affairs" was "doomed to have lots of problems." He stressed that countries must clearly stipulate the military's duties in their constitution and militaries should not deviate from those defined responsibilities.
While the Pakistanis were "difficult," Tantawi said that Egypt was still trying to "work with them." (Note: Tantawi previously served as the Egyptian Defense Attach to Pakistan and was also responsible for Afghanistan. End Note)


Tantawi began by providing a brief overview of regional security concerns. Tantawi said that Egypt was "keeping an eye" on the situation in Sudan because of the Nile's crucial role in Egyptian security and stability. He also expressed concerns over Iran. He noted Egypt maintained a good relationship with Israel and was cooperating on a number of different issues, including border security.

DNI Blair expressed U.S. concern over cyber security threats from hackers and other countries. Tantawi shared these concerns and hoped the U.S. and Egypt could cooperate to combat this threat.

Tantawi said that Egypt had good relations with China, which mostly focused on economic issues. Although Egypt had "some" military relations with China, they did not discuss terrorism or security issues within the Gulf.

May 2009:

Defense Minister Tantawi keeps the Armed Forces appearing reasonably sharp and the officers satisfied with their perks and privileges, and Mubarak does not appear concerned that these forces are not well prepared to face 21st century external threats. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman and Interior Minister al-Adly keep the domestic beasts at bay, and Mubarak is not one to lose sleep over their tactics. Gamal Mubarak and a handful of economic ministers have input on economic and trade matters, but Mubarak will likely resist further economic reform if he views it as potentially harmful to public order and stability. Dr. Zakaria Azmi and a few other senior NDP leaders manage the parliament and public politics.  

(Little take on Mubarak: Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates religious extremism and interference in politics. The Muslim Brothers represent the worst, as they challenge not only Mubarak's power, but his view of Egyptian interests. As with regional issues, Mubarak, seeks to avoid conflict and spare his people from the violence he predicts would emerge from unleashed personal and civil liberties. In Mubarak's mind, it is far better to let a few individuals suffer than risk chaos for society as a whole.)

October 2008:
Comment: Tantawi's physical and mental health has long been rumored to be deteriorating. During the meeting, however, Tantawi appeared in good health and was engaged and quick-witted throughout the conversation.

September 2008: (this entry mainly comes from one source, blacked out "XXXXX", so again, take it for what its worth given the single source and his closeness to the US)

 Since Abu Ghazalah (defense minister pre-1989 who allegedly was fired because he was charismatic and getting popular support), XXXXXXXXXXXX noted, the regime has not allowed any charismatic figures to reach the senior ranks. “(Defense Minister) Tantawi looks like a bureaucrat,” he joked. XXXXXXXXXXXX described the mid-level officer corps as generally disgruntled, and said that one can hear mid-level officers at MOD clubs around Cairo openly expressing disdain for Tantawi. These officers refer to Tantawi as “Mubarak’s poodle,” he said, and complain that “this incompetent Defense Minister” who reached his position only because of unwavering loyalty to Mubarak is “running the military into the ground.” He opined that a culture of blind obedience pervades the MOD where the sole criteria for promotion is loyalty, and that the MOD leadership does not hesitate to fire officers it perceives as being “too competent” and who therefore potentially pose a threat to the regime. 

March 2008:

Reform: In the cabinet, where he still wields significant influence, Tantawi has opposed both economic and political reforms that he perceives as eroding central government power. He is supremely concerned with national unity, and has opposed policy initiatives he views as encouraging political or religious cleavages within Egyptian society. In a speech on March 9, Tantawi said one of the military’s roles is to protect constitutional legitimacy and internal stability, signaling his willingness to use the military to control the Muslim Brotherhood in the run-up to the April 9 municipal council elections. On economic reform, Tantawi believes that Egypt’s economic reform plan fosters social instability by lessening GOE controls over prices and production. Tantawi rejects any conditioning on Egyptian FMF on human rights or any other grounds. Before this year he thought that FMF was inviolable and regarded ESF as a layer of protection against possible cuts to FMF. He will argue that any conditions on military assistance are counter-productive. He will also state that the military is not behind human rights problems in Egypt and that U.S. Congressional human rights conditionally is mis-targeted.

Washington interlocutors should be prepared to meet an aged and change-resistant Tantawi. Charming and courtly, he is, nonetheless mired in a post-Camp David military paradigm that has served his cohort’s narrow interests for the last three decades. He and Mubarak are focused on regime stability and maintaining the status quo through the end of their time. They simply do not have the energy, inclination or world view to do anything differently. Nonetheless, for the benefit of Tantawi’s omnipresent aides, we should focus discussions on the future and how to operate as strategic partners as we face the challenges of that future together. 

Civil Defense: The Red Sea ferry accident in February 2006 embarrassed the Mubarak government and cost more than 1000 lives. Tantawi will bring to Washington his mandate from President Mubarak to integrate the military into crisis response management. On this he needs and will be grateful for our help -- a small but important advance against the MOD’s staunch resistance to engagement with us in shifting their priorities and transforming their forces. ASD for Homeland Defense McHale has suggested including Egyptian representatives in U.S.-based civil emergency exercises

January 2008:
During their hour-long meeting on December 31, DefMin Tantawi told the Ambassador and visiting CODEL Voinovich (Senator Voinovich, R-OH; Rep. Turner, R-OH; Rep. Pearce, R-NM; Rep. Bishop, R-UT; Rep. Gingrey, R-GA) that conditioning Egypt's FMF assistance will harm bilateral relations and would be rejected not only by Egypt's military members, but by all Egyptians. "This (conditioning) is bad for U.S.-Egyptian relations." The average Egyptian sees such conditioning of military aid as U.S. interference in Egypt's internal affairs, Tantawi said. (C) Senator Voinovich said that he understood Tantawi's concern, and stressed that the conditioning can be waived by the Secretary of State; "I hope this can be worked out." Unfortunately, Voinovich said, there are certain members of Congress who do not consider all the ramifications of the U.S.-Egypt relationship. "They don't see the big picture." Turning to the issue of tunneling and smuggling under Egypt's border with Gaza, Voinovich opined that "the sooner we solve that problem, the better for our relationship." Senator Voinovich asked if the Saudis saw Iran in the same way, and if they communicated their concerns directly to the Iranians. Tantawi said that the Saudis try to be helpful. "We and the Saudis are close," he said. "We share views and have the same attitudes."

September 2007:
On September 16, Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi and the Ambassador discussed the impact of the FMF debates on the overall relationship, the state of mil-to-mil relations, border security, the under-disbursement of FMF in FY07, and the peace process. Tantawi said that the U.S. and Egypt must work to strengthen the mil-to-mil relationship despite occasional differences on individual issues. He also warned that Egypt's history with colonialism, occupation and war still impacts Egypt's foreign relations.Tantawi said that the assistance debates impact not only the military and other government officials, but also the Egyptian people, who are "intelligent and sensitive." Referring to the 2007 amendment by Representative Obey, Tantawi said that "those in Congress who would try to pressure Egypt through the military on issues regarding the judiciary, police or borders should know this will not work." President Mubarak was very angry about this development, Tantawi explained -- it was carried out as though Egypt is weak and can be ordered to do things. "It could have been handled another way," he said, again highlighting the sensitivity of the Egyptian people to what they perceive as foreign interference. Tantawi then recounted that when he was a boy, a British officer ordered him to leave the public sidewalk in central Cairo and to cross the street so as to be out of the way. "This was in my own country," Tantwai said; "I was not doing anything wrong." "Colonialism, the wars and Israeli occupation of Sinai are historic issues that we can't leave behind." Border security, the Ambassador said, remains a high priority for the USG, and asked the Minister to increase to 750 the number of Border Guard Forces (BGF) on the border with Gaza and to do everything else possible to stem smuggling. Tantawi repeated his long-standing request that Israel agree to allow Egypt to deploy another border guard unit (with equipment), noting that the current number of troops is insufficient to patrol the 14 kilometer border with Gaza, and even less the 28 kilometer Mediterranean Sea coast of Zone C.

May 2007:

Currently, there is no obvious contender from among the officer corps, Egypt's traditional presidential recruitment grounds. Minister of Defense Tantawi, a contemporary of Mubarak's, appears to harbor no political ambitions. Like Soliman, he could play a role in clearing the way for Gamal, if he calculates that is in the best interests of the country; conversely, he could also be a key player in preventing Gamals ascendance. We have heard some limited reports of Tantawi’s increasing frustration and disenchantment with Gamal (ref b). In the event of a national leadership crisis, it is near inconceivable that given Mubarak's personal manipulation of the office corps, that another military officer could emerge from obscurity to assert himself as a candidate. But Tantawi and his senior coterie are not necessarily popular at mid and lower ranks, so the possibility of a mid-20th century style coup of colonels cannot be entirely discounted.

September 2006:
CENTCOM Commanding General John Abizaid, accompanied by the Ambassador, met on August 30 with Egyptian Minister of Defense Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi to review U.S.-Egyptian mil-mil relations and discuss the regional situation. Abizaid and Tantawi agreed that the U.S.-Egyptian relationship is very strong; but, added Tantawi, "we want even more." General Abizaid thanked Tantawi for Egypt's cooperation in areas as diverse as granting overflight clearances to facilitating usage of the Suez Canal. Tantawi said it was important for the U.S. to remember that, while Egyptian political and military leaders understood the value of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, "the simple people do not see it." We need to work together to convince them, too. The key, according to Tantawi, is the reinvigoration of the peace process. "It is not a peace process just for the Palestinians and Israelis, but for the region as a whole."


April 2006
A key stumbling block for any effort to bring Gamal Mubarak to the presidency could be the military. Each of Egypt's three presidents since the republic was established in 1952 were drawn from the military's officer corps, and the military has historically been the ultimate guarantor of the president's rule. Gamal Mubarak did not serve as a military officer (and it is not clear whether he ever completed, even "on paper," his national military service) and unlike his father, can not take the military's support for granted. This factor is often cited by our contacts, who believe that  Soliman, the intelligence chief with a military background, would have to figure in any succession scenario for Gamal, if only as a transitional figure. Another theory is that some other military officer could emerge from obscurity as a presidential contender. (Defense Minister Tantawi is acknowledged to be frail and without any political ambition.)
Joseph told Tantawi that the U.S. would like to expand the areas of U.S.-Egyptian cooperation and said the Administration will work proactively to educate Members of Congress on Egypt's valuable contributions to regional stability in order to ensure the continuation of military assistance. Joseph cautioned that Congress will look closely at a range of issues including, for example, Egypt's support on Iran, its efforts to help counter weapons of mass destruction, its role in Darfur, and the pace of democratic reform. In this context, there are certain things that Egypt must do to build support in Congress. (C) Tantawi responded that while bilateral relations with the U.S. have always been good, Egypt and the Egyptian people resent the perception in Congress that Egypt must earn its assistance. "Our respect is being violated and our dignity is threatened," Tantawi said. In Tantawi's view, the impact on the relationship, and especially on the armed forces, is very bad. "If we agree that, as equals, we both gain from the relationship, we can better cooperate to achieve our interests," Tantawi said. "Don't spoil the relationship by threatening our military assistance" because this form of pressure "will not work." After complaining about the U.S. decision not to release new defense systems, Tantawi asked Joseph (again) to tell Congress of Egypt's value and argued that Egypt's cooperation with the U.S. has been steadfast. Egypt even disposed of the former USSR-donated chemical weapons it received decades ago just because the U.S. requested it, Tantawi argued.


March 1st 2006:

Summary: During his March 5-10 visit to Washington, Defense Minister Tantawi will seek Administration support for the current level of FMF funding. Tantawi feels that any USG concerns about the pace of democratic reform should be kept distinct from the mil-mil relationship, which he considers the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship.MoD management: On the internal front, Tantawi and his advisors have been unreceptive to suggestions that the Defense Ministry consider a transformation plan, as is done in the U.S. military. Tantawi and his advisors have declined numerous offers of briefings on transformation as it impacts staffing, doctrine, training, and equipment. Decision-making at the Ministry is hierarchical, with Tantawi's personal approval required for nearly all decisions, including, for example, who will attend low-level training. Although we can continue to encourage the Ministry to reevaluate its procedures in light of changing national and regional dynamics and modern practices, absent a change in leadership, it is unlikely that MoD will act. (C) International Medical Center: One sensitive issue on the slate is whether the treatment of third country patients at the FMF-funded International Medical Center (IMC) violates Section Three of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Because the USG funded the IMC for the treatment of members of the Egyptian military and their families, State is exploring whether the IMC's treatment of third country patients is illegal. One of Tantawi's advisors is working with post to collect the information needed to make this determination. Tantawi will not raise this issue himself in any meetings.


March 19th 2006:

Summary: On March 19, the Ambassador and Defense Minister Tantawi discussed Iraq, Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and Tantawi's impressions of his recent visit to Washington. Tantawi reaffirmed the GOE view that for now, U.S. troops must remain in Iraq. On his meetings in Washington, Tantawi said he was concerned by the discussion about potentially drawing down the U.S. presence in the MFO (Multinational Force in Sinai) and reassured by the Administration's support for maintaining the current level of FMF. Tantawi also said Egypt is committed to maintaining strong but "quiet" counter-proliferation cooperation with the U.S. Tantawi said formally joining the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be counter productive as it would certainly arouse domestic political opposition, particularly from the new parliament. End summary.On FMF, Tantawi said he was pleased with the assurances he received from the Administration on the need to maintain the same level of funding for the coming year. Although Tantawi said his meetings with members of Congress were positive, he expressed concern over Representative Obey's apparent change of heart. Tantawi explained that because Obey had always been a "friend" of Egypt, he was surprised and disappointed to hear the Congressman raise questions about Egypt's FMF.


Democratic Reform: Tantawi told the Ambassador that the GOE is working to strike a balance between openness and stability. Noting the MB-Hamas link, Tantawi said the GOE is watching this closely to control, but not crack down on, the MB. He complained that the MB gets away with criticizing the GOE extensively and said there is no way to respond. He invited the Ambassador's "advice." The Ambassador urged the GOE to use increased openness to advantage -- not necessarily for "dialogue" with the Islamists but rather for debate: voices of secular opposition to the MB needed to be heard, whether from within the ruling party, or from a strengthened democratic opposition, or both. Tantawi said that this will all come with time and at a pace appropriate for Egypt. The Ambassador countered that the MB seems to be advancing its agenda at a faster pace to meet what appears to be popular demand for change.
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SCAF Member Confusion

12/25/2011

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Youtube website video: (can't seem to find that video where they are all around the half-circle table - think that's the only time I have seen them all present!  There were tons of them on youtube but can't seem to find any of them recently..!)

1. SIS Website from 2/18/2011: (total of 15)


Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi, former Minister of Defence and Military Production
Lt. General Sami Annan, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Admiral Mohab Memish, the Commander of the Maritime Force
Air Marshal Reda Hafez, the Commander of the Air Force
Lt. General Abdel Aziz Seif, the Commander of the Air Defense Forces
General Hassan al-Rwini, the Commander of the Military Central Zone
Staff General Ismail Othman, the Director of the Morale Affairs Department
General Mohsen al-Fanagry, the Assistant Defense Minister
Staff General Mohammed Abdel Nabi, the Commander of the Border Guard
Staff General Mohammed Hegazy, the Commander of the Third Field Army 
Staff General Sobhy Sedky, the Commander of the Second Field Army 
The commanders of the northern, southern and western zones (3 additional)

[Birth Years: Tantawi (1935), Annan (1948), Hafez (1952), Seifeddin (1949)]

2. Amnesty International Report  (http://goo.gl/e1qvO)
Adds...
  • Major-General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Head of Military Intelligence 
  • Mohammed Said al-Assar, Assistant Defence Minster

For a total of 17...
3. Youm7 (http://allafrica.com/stories/201112050301.html)

Adds

  • Maj. Gen. Mamdouh Abdul Haq, a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) said in a meeting at "90 minutes TV program" on 3/12/2011

For a total of 18...
4. Foreign Affairs magazine, September/October 2011, "Commanding Democracy in Egypt"
  • In May, General Mamdouh Shahin, a member of the SCAF (legal affairs)

For a total of 19...
5. Wikipedia (says they are 18)


A total of 18 members including Six other military commanders (possibly including the four chiefs of staff of the four branches of the Egyptian Armed Forces).

Adds: 
  • Major General Mohamed Saber Attia - Chief of Operations for the Armed Forces

For a total of 20...
Has names for the regional military zone commanders:
  • Major General Hassan Mohammed Ahmed - Commander of the Northern Military Zone
  • Major General Mohsen El-Shazly - Commander of the Southern Military Zone
  • Major General Mahmoud Ibrahim Hegazy - Commander of the Western Military Zone
  • Six other military commanders (possibly including the four chiefs of staff of the four branches of the Egyptian Armed Forces).
Flips SIS designations/titles saying that: 
  • "Major General Mohamed Hegazy â€“ Commander of the Second Field Army; Major General Sedky Sobhy â€“ Commander of the Third Field Army"

From 12/19 Press Conference about Parliament Building
"But only advisors apparently"
  • "Adel Emara"
  • "Kato" (hitler oven dude - old video of him:  http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/332949)

From Carnegie Endowment (Jan 5th, 2012): http://ow.ly/8vqJm

"A list of the nineteen members of the SCAF is provided below, with the first eight being the most outspoken:"

  1. Major General Mukhtar al-Mulla: Assistant defense minister
  2. Major General Adel Amara: Assistant defense minister (he was only highlighted as an advisor before but Carnegie puts him as a proper member)
  3. Also had different names for the commanders of regional armies (Western, Northern and Eastern)

For a total of 22!
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